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I. INTRODUCTION
I only know that ifa man lives long enough he can trace a thing
through the Circumlocution Office of Washington and find out,
after much labor and trouble and delay, that which he could
have found out on the first day if the business of the Circumlocu-
1196 [Vol. 27:1195
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tion Office were as ingeniously systematized as it would be if it
were a great private mercantile institution. I
The federal government purchases large quantities of goods and
services each year. The government2 does not pay for these purchases in
advance,3 so contractors4 need funding to acquire the labor and materials
required for production. Contractors frequently secure such funding by
assigning their accounts receivable, arising from government's purchases,
to banks and other financial intermediaries.5 Financial intermediaries,
however, may be an expensive source of funding.6 An intermediary ob-
tains funds at a "wholesale" rate and advances those funds at "retail"
rates to its customers. From the customer's perspective, it is cheaper to
obtain funding at the intermediary's wholesale rate.
Securitization allows organizations to bypass intermediaries and ob-
tain lower-cost financing.7 It enables companies with quality assets to
sell securities, backed by those assets, directly to investors.' At a mini-
mum, the organization raising funds through securitization saves on the
cost of the intermediary's overhead and profit margin.9 There can be
1. MARK TWAIN, The Facts in the Great Beef Contract, in THE COMPLETE SHORT STO-
RIES OF MARK TWAIN 40, 45 (Charles Neider ed., Bantam Books 1971) (1957).
2. This Comment uses the terms "government" and "federal" to describe all federal
agencies. The financial markets do make credit distinctions between different agencies because
the "full faith and credit" guarantee does not extend to all agencies. See MARCIA STIGUM,
THE MONEY MARKET 41-42 (3d ed. 1990). Although this may be relevant to the pricing of a
specific transaction, it is not critical to this general discussion.
3. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §§ 32.903, 52.232-.25 (1992) (setting out due dates for contract
payments).
4. The term "contractor" describes a party that provides goods or services for a price.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 326 (6th ed. 1990).
5. For an excellent discussion of lending against federal receivables, see Heidi M.
Schooner & Steven L. Schooner, Look Before You Lend: A Lender's Guide to Financing Gov-
ernment Contracts Pursuant to the Assignment of Claims Act, 48 Bus. LAW. 535 (1993).
6. See Steven Pearlstein & Jerry Knight, Banks Lose Out as Depositors Go Elsewhere:
Many Options Available for Saving, Borrowing, Investing, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1993, at Al
(noting bank share of credit market declines due to more efficient alternatives). In one report,
an Arlington, Virginia contractor found that it was less expensive to speed up payments by
hand delivering invoices to a payment processor in Philadelphia than to borrow against receiv-
ables. Jill Andresky Fraser, Account Receivables: Faster Government Collections, INC., Apr.
1993, at 43, 43.
7. Stephen I. Glover, Structured Finance Goes Chapter 11: Asset Securitization by Reor-
ganizing Companies, 47 Bus. LAW. 611, 615 (1992) (stating securitization reduces costs by
tapping markets directly).
8. See Steven Pearlstein, Recycling Money: How the New System Works: With 'Securi-
tization' the Never-Ending Buying, Selling of Loans Benefits Consumers, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,
1993, at A12.
9. See Pearlstein & Knight, supra note 6, at A12 (noting conduits need half of bank's
spread to profit).
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additional savings if the assets merit a higher credit rating than the or-
ganization selling those accounts.10 Thus, at a time when securitization
is common, 11 government contractors should exploit ways to securitize
their federal accounts receivable and reduce financing costs. 2
The potential for federal assignment-backed securities (FAst-
BackS)'3 is staggering. For example, the Department of Defense spends
roughly $150 billion on procurement, operations, and maintenance annu-
ally."4 To the extent these expenditures create receivables on the books
of government suppliers, they could give rise to a comparable level of
securitization. Considering that private industry securitizes around
thirty-five billion dollars of receivables each year,' 5 government receiv-
ables represent a significant new market.
This Comment explains why the securitization of federal accounts
receivable makes sense. As a framework, Part II reviews asset securitiza-
tion and discusses how a recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
impacts the future of these transactions. Part III introduces the Assign-
ment of Claims Act of 1940 (ACA), 6 a prerequisite 7 to using federal
accounts receivable in a financing, and compares the rights of assignees
under the ACA with those of commercial and consumer assignees. Part
IV examines statutory requirements and concludes that the ACA permits
securitization. Part V addresses some of the issues faced in structuring
10. See Glover, supra note 7, at 615 (asserting that higher credit rating contributes to
lower costs). For example, Advanta Corporation's senior debt is rated B2, whereas the Ad-
vanta Credit Card Master Trust is rated Aaa. 2 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S BANK
& FINANCE MANUAL 5352, 5601 (1993). An investment rated B2 "generally lack[s the] char-
acteristics of [a] desirable investment," while the Aaa rating is given to bonds with "the small-
est degree of investment risk." Moody's Investors Serv., MOODY'S BOND RECORD, Mar. 1993,
at 3. There could be more than a I% difference in interest cost between Aaa and B2 securities.
See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Jan. 1993, at 428 tbl. B-69 (evidencing more than
1% average spread between Aaa and Baa securities).
11. See Pearlstein & Knight, supra note 6, at A12 (noting 80% of mortgages, 50% of
college loans, and 15% of car loans are securitized).
12. Securitization has the reputation of being a cost effective form of financing, See, e.g.,
Pearlstein, supra note 8, at A12 ("[S]tudies have shown that the process has reduced the price
of home mortgage loans by up to a half-percentage point.").
13. Recognizing that the success of any capital markets product may depend upon a
snappy acronym, this Author proposes "FAst-BackS"-Federal Assignment-Backed
Securities.
14. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT: FISCAL YEAR 1993 pt. Two-5 (Supp. Feb. 1992) (National Defense Outlays by Func-
tion and Program).
15. See Michael Liebowitz, Can Corporate America Securitize. . . Itselfi, INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 27, 1992, at 14.
16. Ch. 779, § 1, 54 Stat. 1029 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1988) and 41 U.S.C. § 15
(1988)).
17. Compliance with the ACA may not be an absolute prerequisite. See infra note 228.
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FAst-BackS transactions and Part VI suggests why and how government
should facilitate this financing alternative.
II. SECURITIZATION
A. Background
1. The securitization model
Securitization allows parties to finance their assets directly in the
capital markets. The technique has been described as the
sale of equity or debt instruments, representing ownership in-
terests in, or secured by, a segregated, income-producing asset
or pool of assets, in a transaction structured to reduce or reallo-
cate certain risks inherent in owning or lending against the un-
derlying assets and to ensure that such interests are more
readily marketable and, thus, more liquid than ownership inter-
ests in and loans against the underlying assets.'8
In short, by selling investment interests in the cash flow generated by a
segregated pool of assets, securitization turns those assets into marketa-
ble securities."9 From an investor's perspective, the purchaser of a
securitized interest becomes a partner in the proceeds generated by that
asset pool without exposing itself to the credit risks of either the asset
pool's originator2" or some other organization.
To securitize accounts, 21 a sponsor22 sells selected accounts23 to a
bankruptcy remote entity (BRE)-a trust, corporation, or partner-
18. Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Is-
sues and New Frontiers, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1369, 1374-75 (1991).
19. See, e.g., Asset Securitization and Secondary Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Policy Research and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Af-
fairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1991) [hereinafter Secondary Market Hearings] (statement of
Donald G. Coonley). Some, like Mr. Coonley, emphasize that securitization involves "illiquid
assets." See id. This is not completely accurate. Before the United States Treasury began
selling zero coupon bonds (STRIPs), Wall Street synthesized zero coupon bonds through
securitization. See STIGUM, supra note 2, at 690-91 (discussing menagerie of zero coupon
bonds-CATs, TIGRs, and LIONs). Although the underlying treasury securities were highly
liquid, it was profitable to "repackage" these securities because of an investor preference for
zero coupon instruments. Id.
20. An originator creates, or is the original owner of, the asset.
21. This Comment provides only an overview of the process. For more detailed discus-
sions, see, for example, TAMAR FRANKEL, STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS
POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991); Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance:
The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 607 (1990); Shenker & Coletta, supra
note 18. An overview also appears in STIGUM, supra note 2, at 1095-97.
22. A "sponsor" is the organization that is raising funds through securitization. Shenker
& Colletta, supra note 18, at 1376 n.25. A sponsor may be a seller or an originator.
23. This Comment uses the terms receivable, account, and accounts receivable inter-
changeably. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1990). While this text refers to the sale of accounts, a trans-
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ship.2 4 A servicer is appointed to manage the collection and administra-
tive functions of the BRE.25 To fund its purchase of the accounts, the
BRE sells to investors securities that are backed by the projected stream
of payments-cash flow-that the accounts will generate.26  The cash
flow from the assets will be passed through the BRE to repay investors.27
Since actual cash flow may vary from projections, investors demand
protection against payment deficiencies-that is, credit enhancement. 28
Credit enhancement, which protects against the risk of loss, can be pro-
vided internally or purchased from third parties. It may include
purchase discounts, reserve accounts, holdbacks, cash collateral ac-
counts, letters of credit, or insurance bonds.29 Whatever method, or
combination of methods, is used, the sponsor provides credit enhance-
ment in an amount that is several times greater than a potential cash flow
deficiency. 0 This structure is supposed to compensate investors for their
risk of loss.3 It protects investors from deviations in the expected cash
action's prospectus may refer to the sale of a receivable in an account. This distinguishes the
dollar balance from the account relationship, which is perceived to have its own economic
value. In most transactions, only the receivable is being securitized. See, e.g., Secondary Mar-
ket Hearings, supra note 19, at 281 (MBNA credit card prospectus).
24. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 18, at 1378. "Bankruptcy remote" means that the
purchasing entity will not be substantively consolidated with the seller in the event of a bank-
ruptcy. See Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 613, 616. Generally, bankruptcy remote entities,
special purpose vehicles, and account "purchasers" are equivalent terms.
25. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 18, at 1376. A sponsor or seller can also function
as servicer. See, e.g., Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 256, 285, 293 (MBNA
credit card prospectus). While securitization can involve a cast of administrative characters,
this Comment assumes that all administrative functions are performed by the servicer.
26. See Schwarez, supra note 21, at 609.
27. See Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 145 (Moody's Investor Service
materials). This process is more complicated for noninterest bearing receivables, which must
be discounted to allow for the time value of money. See Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 16 ("How
it works"). Due to the uncertainty of the discounting period, the time to payment, interest
bearing assets are more attractive for securitization. It is advantageous that outstanding fed-
eral accounts accrue interest. See Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 536.
28. Shenker & Colletta, supra note 18, at 1376.
29. FRANKEL, supra note 21, §§ 9.1-.9.
30. See, e.g., Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 26 (statement of Clifford
Griep) ("[C]urrent credit support levels provide loss coverage, which is about three to four
times higher than current receivable loss experience.").
31. Some are concerned that securitization allows sellers to dispose of risky assets. See,
e.g., Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 227, 235, 240 (concerning securitization of
"risky" assets). However, because investors demand that the sponsor provides credit enhance-
ment, the "more risky the loans are the more costly it will be to securitize them." FRANKEL,
supra note 21, § 2.7, at 57. In effect, the sponsor, through credit enhancement, compensates
the investor for accepting risk. See id. Since credit enhancement is based upon projected
losses, it may be more accurate to say that securitization allows a sponsor to avoid extraordi-
nary losses-losses that exceed the level of credit enhancement.
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flow, and it insulates investors from the credit declines of third party
organizations.
The following diagram depicts a typical transaction:
SECURITIZATION MODEL
Sale of Accounts Sale of securities backed
by accounts
2. Account securitization depends upon cash flow
Because a securitized offering is designed to protect the expected
cash flow of an asset pool, "cash flow securitization" may be the most
accurate way to describe these financings.32 Consider, for example, the
securitization of accounts that Associated Grocers Inc. (Associated)
completed in 1988.11 The underlying assets consisted of retail grocer-
ies.34 Although the securities were dubbed "grocery-backed bonds," it is
hard to imagine that investors believed that, upon a default, levying upon
retail groceries would provide a dependable source of repayment. In-
32. See Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 608; cf Shenker & Colletta, supra note 18, at 1376
n.27 ("It is conceivable, though much less likely, that a non-income-producing asset (e.g., raw
land) might be securitized.").
33. Associated Grocers, Inc. is a grocery wholesaler that supplies independent grocers in
the Northwest. See Green Stamps Not Included, AssET SALES REP. (American Banker, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.), Feb. 16, 1988, at 1. Usually, trade receivables are securitized through com-
mercial paper conduits. See Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 14-15. This was one of the first
transactions to use trade receivables in a term financing. See id. (noting that Mattel, Inc.
completed first term offering in September 1987).
34. See Green Stamps Not Included, supra note 33, at 1.
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stead, investors were betting that the strong historical payment relation-
ship between Associated and its customers would continue into the
future.3" Cash flow, as opposed to liquidation value, made the transac-
tion possible.
Given the importance of cash flow, one would expect investment
bankers to prepare extensive cash flow analyses as a guide to structuring
a transaction. In this regard, many writers have observed that statistical
analysis plays a large role in securitization.36 Statistical analysis is popu-
lar because it provides an objective means of measuring historical pay-
ment relationships which, in turn, are used to estimate future cash flows.
Investors favor asset pools with a large number of diversified borrowers
because these characteristics are supposed to improve statistical
reliability.37
While statistical analysis is valuable, it is important to understand
that the measurement of past performance does not guarantee future per-
formance. 38 Fundamentally, there are some types of cash flow risk that
cannot be measured or controlled using statistical methods.3 9 Therefore,
a common sense understanding of the business that gives rise to the sub-
ject cash flows may be the best guide for estimating risk.40 Intuitively, an
established business in a stable industry is likely to possess the cash flow
35. See id. at 5.
36. E.g., Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 157 (Moody's Investor Service
materials) (stating Moody's considers likely loss scenario and potential variability of loss);
Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 610 (stating number of obligors must be large enough so that risk
of loss can be statistically determined); Shenker & Colletta, supra note 18, at 1377 (stating
delinquency and loss experience should support statistical analysis).
37. Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 209 (Moody's Investors Service materi-
als) (reviewing rating methodology for portfolio characteristics); Schwarcz, supra note 21, at
610-12; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 18, at 1376-77 & n.29.
38. Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 263 (MBNA credit card prospectus)
(stating sponsor "is unable to determine and has no basis to predict whether, or to what extent,
social, legal or economic factors will affect future card use or repayment patterns").
39. See, e.g., Firms Scramble to Unload CMO Inventories as Managers Rebel, BoNDWEEK
(Institutional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Nov. 22, 1993, at 1, 11 (stating investors "have
lost confidence in the Street's ability to evaluate payment schedules and cash flow risks embed-
ded in structured mortgage-backeds").
40. PAUL A. VATTER ET AL., QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN MANAGEMENT 262 (1978).
[D]ecision makers must specify which data are useful and which are reliable, and in
doing so, use their own judgement and knowledge about the decision situations ....
[Using] past data as an indication of what is likely to happen in the future ... is
advisable only when the decision maker is convinced that the particular data being
used are a good guide for the future.
Id. Predicting social and economic trends is difficult because the many factors that generate
these trends are constantly in flux. See RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND
TRUTH 11 (Hilda Geiringer ed., Dover Publications 1981) (1957) ("[P]robability calculus[]
applies only to problems in which either the same event repeats itself again and again, or a
great number of uniform elements are involved at the same time.") (emphasis added).
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characteristics that favor securitization. In the Associated financing, get-
ting investors to understand that a retail grocer must pay its wholesaler
to stay in business may have been more meaningful than any statistical
analysis.
This technical distinction is important to the securitization of ac-
counts. Account transactions are different from mortgage, auto loan, or
lease-backed securities, which are likely to consist of a single pool of obli-
gations that are identified in advance of the offering. In account securi-
tization, the underlying accounts have short maturities.41 A vendor
might expect an account to be paid within ninety or so days. To obtain
financing for any length of time, the receivable pool must be replenished
with new receivables until the desired maturity is achieved.42 Rather
than identifying specific obligations in advance, accounts are being cre-
ated over the term of the financing. Because a receivables pool is con-
stantly "rolling over," an understanding of the sponsor's continuing
ability to provide quality receivables may be more important than the
historical record.43 Notably, although securitization is supposed to insu-
late investors from the risks associated with other organizations, an in-
vestor in a receivable-backed security has ongoing exposure to the
sponsor's' continuing ability to supply quality receivables to the pool.
B. The True Sale Issue
1. A true sale is a requirement
Securitization focuses on cash flow. That focus has little value if the
structure of a securitized offering does not preserve cash flow for the
benefit of investors. To preserve cash flow, transactions are structured to
legally separate the sponsor or originator from the assets used in the fi-
nancing.4" While this may not insulate investors from the risks associ-
ated with a servicer's or originator's continuing operations, 46 this
41. Cardholders may pay off their bills within 30 days, whereas a credit card receivable-
backed security could have a maturity of several years. See Secondary Market Hearings, supra
note 19, at 257-58 (MBNA credit card prospectus) (indicating certificateholders receive sched-
uled return of principal 3 1/2 years after issuance).
42. Id. at 162-63 (MBNA credit card prospectus) (noting credit card receivables are "re-
volving," "continually being repaid and renewed"); id. at 163-64 (Moody's Investors Service
materials) (stating it is "possible to structure note programs to accommodate [trade] receiv-
ables"); see also Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 16 ("How it works").
43. Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 163-64 (Moody's Investors Services
materials) (preparing credit rating includes evaluation of issuer's operations).
44. If the sponsor is not the originator, there is ongoing exposure to the originator's opera-
tions as well.
45. Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 608.
46. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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separation minimizes the risk that a related party's bankruptcy would
impair or delay the investor's right to receive cash flow. 7
A "true sale" of the assets from the originator to the BRE performs
this legal separation.48 In the absence of a true sale, a court might con-
clude that the assets were merely collateral for a loan. 49 As collateral,
the assets would be part of the sponsor's bankruptcy estate, 50 payments
to investors would be stopped by the automatic stay, and the trustee
could use the assets as cash collateral."' Without a true sale, the investor
has little bankruptcy protection.52
It is surprising, then, that account securitization can take place
when there is no way to guarantee the existence of a legal sale: 3
"[T]here has not been any specific legal determination that the sale of [a
sponsor's] assets to a bankruptcy-remote, wholly owned, special-purpose
vehicle typically used in [securitization] constitute[s] a true sale."'5 4 In
the sale of accounts, where a seller can be characterized as continuing to
yield significant control over the assets,55 there is reason to question
whether a sale has actually occurred. In practice, courts will determine
whether a true sale has occurred by applying a balancing test that weighs
the practices, objectives, activities, and overall relationship of the seller
and purchaser of the assets. 6 In the absence of any guarantees, parties
rely upon legal opinions for the assurance that a specific transaction will
be treated as a true sale.57
47. Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 613 ("The source of payment must be separated from the
originator in the event the originator becomes troubled or bankrupt.").
48. Id. at 618-19.
49. Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 172 (Moody's Investors Service materi-
als); Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 619-21.
50. Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 620.
51. Id.
52. Because the seller could retain a perfected security interest in the assets, the seller still
has some protection vis-a-vis other creditors.
53. Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 621.
54. Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 235 (quoting Andrew Silver). Notably,
nine months earlier a federal court authorized a true sale of a debtor's credit card accounts to a
bankruptcy remote entity. See In re Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., No. 90-00132, 1990 Bankr.
LEXIS 2453, at *8-*9 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 1990). In its order the court held that the special
purpose vehicle was the sole owner of the receivables and that neither the sponsor nor any of
its creditors had any ownership rights in the receivables. Id.
55. The seller's control could be demonstrated through servicing activities, continuing
business relationships with account debtors, and a perceived ability to control the quality of
new receivables. See Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 623.
56. A thorough discussion appears id. at 621-24. See also Major's Furniture Mart v. Cas-
tle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544-46 (3d Cir. 1979) (discussing balancing test).
57. Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 131 (testimony of Clifford Griep); id. at
172 (Moody's Investors Service materials).
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2. Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer
rejects the true sale of an account
Despite the lack of any legal guarantee, it seems fair to assume that
the issue is not whether the law prohibits the sale of an account, but
whether the requirements of a sale have been met for a specific transac-
tion. In Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve,
Inc.),58 however, the Tenth Circuit recently rejected the possibility that
there could be a legally binding sale of an account.5 9 The court deter-
mined that the purchaser of an account6" is, for all purposes, a secured
party.6" It expressly rejected the notion that a purchaser takes title of an
account and relieves the seller of all ownership interests.62
The Octagon decision threatens financial securitization in two ways.
First, it rejects the concept of the "true sale" of an account.63 The true
sale to a BRE is the primary source of bankruptcy protection. 64 Second,
it endorses a broad definition of the bankruptcy estate.65 By doing so,
Octagon further exposes securitized assets to the bankruptcy of a selling
or servicing organization. Since securitization is supposed to avoid pay-
ment interruptions and other uncertainties that arise in the course of a
third party's bankruptcy, broad acceptance of the Octagon decision
would effectively bar account securitization. Therefore, if the securitiza-
tion of federal accounts is to be feasible, it is necessary to evaluate Octa-
gon's impact on future account transactions.
a. the Tenth Circuit takes a narrow view of
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9
In Octagon, the Tenth Circuit held that a "sold" account remains
the property of the seller's bankruptcy estate and the "purchaser" of an
account could never be more than a secured creditor.66 The court rea-
soned that the policies underlying Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
Article 9 support its holding.67 Referring to Official Comment 2 to UCC
58. 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 144 S. Ct. 554 (1993).
59. Id. at 957.
60. The subject of this dispute was a royalty interest and not an account receivable. The
court determined that this interest was an account under Article 9. Compare id. at 954-55 with
id. at 960 (Seth, J., dissenting) (asserting definition of "account" is not appropriate).
61. Id. at 955.
62. Id. at 956.
63. Id. at 955.
64. See supra part II.B.1.
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
66. Octagon, 995 F.2d at 957 & n.9.
67. Id. at 956.
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section 9-102, the court noted that "'the distinction between a security
transfer and sale is blurred, and a sale of such property is therefore cov-
ered by [9-102(1)(b)] whether intended for security or not.' ,68 Presuma-
bly to avoid "secret liens," the court concluded that the "buyer of an
account is treated as a secured party, his interest in the account is treated
as a security interest, the seller of the account is a debtor, and the ac-
count sold is treated as collateral.
'69
It is questionable whether, as the court asserted, UCC section 9-102
intended to invalidate any transfer of title in the sale of an account. In
laying out rules for its interpretation, the UCC emphasizes the impor-
tance of preserving freedom of contract.70 While a contractual provision
cannot destroy UCC-created rights,71 there seems to be no harm in al-
lowing title to pass provided that an account purchaser takes title subject
to superior Article 9 interests. In fact, this result may be preferable be-
cause, in the spirit of UCC section 1-102, it does no damage to a freely
negotiated contract. 2
Arguably, Article 9 is less concerned with regulating title and more
concerned with regulating security interests.73 Professor Gilmore74 ex-
plained that prior to the UCC, lenders could materially alter their rights
depending upon whether they were described as a beneficiary or an as-
signee.7 Since it did not make sense for a mere "label" to determine a
lender's rights, Article 9 provided that, whether the lender "describes
himself as assignee, third party beneficiary, Supreme Exalted Potentate,
Lord of the Three Worlds or whatever, ' 76 UCC rules apply if the trans-
action "creates a security interest. 77 A security interest was defined to
include "any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper, ' 78 so that
the "label" for a transaction could not defeat a previously arising right in
such collateral. Allowing an account purchaser to take free of any previ-
ously arising interest simply because the account was "sold" invites
68. Id. at 955 (citing Official Comment 2 to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-102 (West
Supp. 1993)) (emphasis omitted).
69. Id. at 954-55 (footnote omitted).
70. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 2 (1990) ("Subsection (3) states affirmatively at the outset that
freedom of contract is a principle of the Code ... .
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 9-101 cmt.
74. Professor Gilmore was the reporter for the Article 9 project. 1 GRANT GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY at x (1965).
75. See Grant Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74
YALE L.J. 217, 223-34 (1964) (discussing third party beneficiary "caper").
76. Id. at 226.
77. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
78. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
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abuse. 9 Therefore, even a purchaser of an account should be required to
comply with Article 9.80
However, while section 9-202 states that title to collateral is immate-
rial, 81 that does not mean that title is immaterial for all purposes. In fact,
the Official Comment to section 9-101 states that
[t]his Article does not determine whether "title" to collateral is
in the secured party or in the debtor and adopts neither a "title
theory" nor a "lien theory" of security interests. Rights, obli-
gations and remedies under the Article do not depend on the
location of title (Section 9-202). The location of title may be-
come important for other purposes ... and in such a case the
parties are left free to contract as they will. 
82
Furthermore, the Official Comment to section 9-202, the section that ex-
pressly notes title as "immaterial," acknowledges that
[Article 9] in no way determines which line of interpretation
... should be followed in cases where the applicability of some
other rule of law depends upon who has title.... [T]his Article
does not attempt to define whether the secured party is a
"legal" owner .... Other rules of law or the agreement of the
parties determine the location of "title" for such purposes.83
While Article 9 may be indifferent to title, that Article does not op-
pose a transfer of title. For example, assume that Article 9 intended to
invalidate the transfer of title. If one attempted to sell an account to
secure a debt, then the "seller" would retain any surplus between the
value of the account and the associated debt. The "seller" retains the
surplus because the account was never really "sold." UCC section 9-
502(2), however, operates in exactly the opposite manner. It states that
"if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts,"84 it is presumed
that the debtor does not have any rights to the surplus.85 Here, the UCC
expressly acknowledges the possibility of a sale and creates a unique re-
79. Rimmer argued that because the account was "sold," the bankruptcy estate could not
have an interest in the account because the account did not belong to the seller. Octagon, 995
F.2d at 955.
80. Alternatively, the circuit court could have achieved the same result by leaving title to
the account with Rimmer and making his unperfected interest subject to the interests of the
bankruptcy estate.
81. See U.C.C. § 9-202 (stating provisions of Article 9 apply whether secured party or
debtor holds title).
82. Id. § 9-101 cmt. (emphasis added).
83. Id. § 9-202 cmt.
84. Id. § 9-502(2) (emphasis added).
85. Id.
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suit to accommodate a sale.86 This distinction would not be necessary if
Article 9 invalidated sales. 7 Official Comment 4 to section 9-502 justi-
fies this result on the grounds of "freedom of contract""8 and "recognizes
that there may be a true sale of accounts."89
Thus, there is a compelling alternative to the Tenth Circuit's conclu-
sion that Article 9 invalidates the sale of an account. The UCC's policy
to preserve freedom of contract, its acknowledgement that title may mat-
ter outside Article 9's scope of determining priorities, its admission that
Article 9 does not decide matters of title, and the express recognition
within Article 9 that a true sale of accounts could exist suggest that the
legal sale of an account is possible but that the purchaser takes title sub-
ject to previously perfected interests.
b. Octagon takes a broad view of the bankruptcy estate
Under Octagon, an account "seller" retains a property interest in the
account 9° because Article 9 does not provide for a transfer of title. Ac-
cordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the sale of an account does
not "place that account beyond the reach of the bankruptcy trustee" 91
because the property of the bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equi-
table interests of the debtor in property."9 In doing so, the court does
not limit the reach of the bankruptcy trustee, allowing the trustee to re-
cover property without regard to the nature of the debtor's interest. Oc-
tagon, therefore, places assets within reach of the bankruptcy trustee
even if the debtor does not have an economic interest in the asset.93
To support this position, the court relied heavily upon United States
v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 94 Whiting Pools, however, did not deal with the
sale of an account but rather with a situation in which a creditor took
possession of property to satisfy a lien.95 The debtor never alienated this
property and the property otherwise would have been available to reha-
86. See also Major's Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 543-46 (3d Cir.
1979) (acknowledging possibility of account sale and describing attributes of sale).
87. Alternatively, Article 9 would be redefining the term "sale" as a bundle of rights that
does not include the transfer of title. Why not call this a security interest? See U.C.C. § I-
201(37).
88. Id. § 9-502 cmt. 4.
89. Id.
90. See Octagon, 995 F.2d at 956.
91. Id.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
93. Octagon, 995 F.2d at 956.
94. 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
95. Id. at 199-200.
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bilitate the debtor.96 It held that a trustee can prevent either a secured or
unsecured creditor from seizing a debtor's assets.97 In that same opinion,
the Court explained that Congress did not intend to include in the bank-
ruptcy estate "property of others in which the debtor had some minor
interest such as a lien or bare legal title." 98 There is no authority for the
trustee to take property in which the debtor does not have a real eco-
nomic interest99 and the bankruptcy estate cannot create an interest that
was never there.I°0 Even if the sale of an account does not qualify as a
true sale, that account, contrary to Octagon, might not become property
of the estate because the seller would not retain an economic interest in
the sold account.' 01
3. Securitization after Octagon
Although Octagon threatens securitization, there is reason to believe
that this decision should not weigh heavily on a properly structured
transaction. Notably, rating agencies'02 have downplayed the decision:
Standard & Poors believes that the decision is "inconsistent with the pur-
pose and intent of the UCC"; 03 Fitch Investor Service calls it "contrary
to existing precedent and unlikely to be followed"; ° and Duff & Phelps
suggests the case was wrongly decided.'0 5 With the exception of transac-
tions that take place in the Tenth Circuit, the rating agencies have not
made material changes to their ratings requirements. '
0 6
96. Id. at 201.
97. Id. at 203-04.
98. Id. at 204 n.8.
99. Id. at 206 n.12 (stating no turnover required when "property is of inconsequential
value or benefit to the estate"); see also In re Paolella, 79 B.R. 607, 609-10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987) (stating property should be abandoned if estate lacks equity).
100. See Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir.) (indicating estate only gets what
debtor could convey), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 893 (1989); Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re Quality
Holstein Leasing), 752 F.2d 1009, 1013 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Congress did not mean to authorize a
bankruptcy estate to benefit from property that the debtor did not own.").
101. National Bank v. Erickson (In re Seaway Express Corp.), 912 F.2d 1125, 1127-28 (9th
Cir. 1990) (equitable interests held by others are excluded from property of estate).
102. See Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 149 (Moody's Investors Service
discussion of ratings).
103. Rating Agencies Assess Consequences of Octagon Decision, ASSET SALES REP. (Ameri-
can Banker, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 27, 1993, at 10.
104. Id. at 11.
105. Id.
106. Rating Agencies Downplay Ruling, BONDWEEK (Institutional Investor, Inc., New
York, N.Y.), Oct. 4, 1993, at 4.
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The volume of securitized offerings' 0 7 subsequent to the Octagon de-
cision indicates that issuers and investors have also chosen to downplay
the decision.108 Since Octagon was decided, such well-known names as
American Express, Chrysler, Citicorp, Ford Credit, First Chicago, Gen-
eral Motors, John Deere, Mitsubishi, and Toyota have come to market
with over $5.5 billion in auto loan-backed and $7.6 billion in credit card
receivable-backed offerings.109 In short, it appears that Octagon has not
chilled the flow of offerings within its reach.110
107. This is reflected in the volume of trade receivable, credit card receivable, and auto loan
offerings since Octagon was decided. See infra note 109. Octagon impacts transactions gov-
erned by Article 9. See supra part II.B.2.a. Trade receivable and credit card receivable offer-
ings are, by definition, account transactions under Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(a) (1990).
Auto loans, which would be considered chattel paper, are also treated like an account under
UCC Article 9. See id. §§ 9-105(1)(b), 9-102(b).
108. This may have been influenced by the availability of ratings. Ratings directly affect the
pricing and marketability of securities. See FRANKEL, supra note 21, §§ 9.16-. 17.
109. See Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.),
July 19, 1993, at 10 (Ford Credit-$1.1 billion in auto loans); Financing Record, BoNDWEEK
(Institutional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 23, 1993, at 7-8 (First Chicago-$700
million in credit card receivables; MBNA-$750 million in credit card receivables; Toyota-
$467 million in auto loans); Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional Investor, Inc., New
York, N.Y.), Aug. 30, 1993, at 9 (Citicorp-almost $800 million in credit card receivables);
Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 6, 1993,
at 10 (USAA-over $200 million in auto loans); Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional
Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 13, 1993, at 8 (Household Affinity Credit Card Trust-
$900 million in credit card receivables); Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional Inves-
tor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 20, 1993, at 8 (American Express--$600 million in credit
card receivables; GMAC-$1.3 billion in auto loans; Chrysler-more than $1 billion in auto
loans); Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 4,
1993, at 8 (Signet-over $1 billion in credit card receivables); Financing Record, BONDWEEK
(Institutional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 11, 1993, at 9 (John Deere-over $600
million in equipment loans); Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional Investor, Inc., New
York, N.Y.), Oct. 18, 1993, at 9-10 (First USA-1.25 billion in credit card receivables; Mit-
subishi Motors-almost $350 million in auto loans); Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institu-
tional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 25, 1993, at 7 (Capital Auto Receivables Asset
Trust-roughly $1.3 billion in auto loans); Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional In-
vestor, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Nov. 8, 1993, at 11 (Navistar--over $300 million in truck
receivables); Financing Record, BONDWEEK (Institutional Investor, Inc., New York, N.Y.),
Nov. 22, 1993, at 8-9 (Advanta Credit Card Master Trust-400 million in credit card receiv-
ables; Dean Witter-almost $1.2 billion in Discover card receivables).
110. See, e.g., Slight Increase Predicted in Asset-Backed Issuance, ASSET SALES REP.
(American Banker, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Dec. 27, 1993, at 3 (noting that market increased
20% over 1993 and was expected to grow through 1994).
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This does not mean, however, that Octagon should be ignored.111
Despite an apparent conflict between the circuits,1 12 the Supreme Court
has denied a petition for certiorari on this issue." 3 The decision is good
law in the Tenth Circuit and it might influence courts in other jurisdic-
tions. Therefore, investors and rating agencies will probably be taking a
closer look at the credit strength of securitization sponsors.114 If the
sponsor does not seek bankruptcy protection, Octagon is not an issue. As
a result, without halting securitization, Octagon may have increased the
importance of a sponsor's credit to future deals. If so, the decision has
dampened smaller and less creditworthy organizations' ability to access
this market.
C. Securitization Has Risks
To review, securitization is a financing technique that uses the cash
flow generated by a segregated pool of assets to create marketable securi-
ties. Asset cash flow is the primary source of repayment for these securi-
ties, and investors are attracted to the expected reliability of the
underlying assets' cash flow. Although securitization is supposed to min-
imize the investor's risk of loss, investors are still exposed to analytical,
business, and legal risks.
First, investors face the risk that the statistical methods used to
measure cash flow reliability are not a reliable barometer of future
change. 115 Second, investors have exposure to the financial health of the
originator and the servicer. To the extent the originator's financial
health fails,116 there may be an incentive to reduce credit standards in
favor of achieving sales objectives. As the servicer's health declines,
1 17
I11. See Paul E. Weber & R. Kenneth MacCallum, Rating Agencies Offer Response to Oc-
tagon, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 1993, at 11 (acknowledging securitization may be uneconomical or
impossible in Tenth Circuit); Issuers Begin to Disclose 'Octagon' Decision in Prospectuses, AS-
SET SALES REP. (American Banker, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 27, 1993, at 3 (observing
issuers likely to disclose potential consequences due to Octagon in all ABS prospectuses).
112. See In re Contractor's Equip. Supply Co., 861 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing
between sales and security interests in account transactions); Major's Furniture Mart v. Castle
Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing sale with recourse may not convert to
security interest).
113. Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer, 126 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1993).
114. See Weber & MacCallum, supra note 111.
115. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
116. See Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 162-64 (Moody's Investors Services
materials) (acknowledging third party risks in credit card and trade receivables programs).
117. Id. at 174-75. In many transactions, investors have the right to replace the servicer.
See, e.g., id. at 293 (MBNA credit card prospectus) (discussing servicer default). It is ques-
tionable whether this right has any practical significance. See Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 18-
19 (discussing servicing risk).
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staff reductions or reorganizations might distract from collection activi-
ties. Furthermore, account obligors might withhold payment if they per-
ceive that either the originator or servicer has suffered a financial
setback. 1 ' Finally, there is some legal risk in account securitization.
Recalling that a true sale to a BRE would provide protection against a
third party's bankruptcy, 19 there is no way to guarantee the legal sale of
an account 120 and the Tenth Circuit has directly attacked the proposition
that a true sale could exist.'
2 1
In short, while securitization is supposed to compensate investors
against risk, these transactions involve business, legal and, to some ex-
tent, cash flow risks that cannot be measured with mathematical accu-
racy. It is, therefore, impossible to know whether the level of credit
enhancement accompanying a securitized transaction has adequately
provided for these contingencies. Because securitization continues in
volume, however, it appears that investors have some tolerance to less
than perfect protection. Investors may be willing to accept these risks
because the businesses that securitize receivables are familiar to them and
that familiarity underlies a subjective assessment of safety. 122 Therefore,
to the extent that investors can develop a subjective comfort with the
government contracting industry, they should be receptive to a security
backed by federal accounts receivable, provided that the sale of those
accounts is not otherwise prohibited by law.
III. THE ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS ACT
A. Background
As a first step in securitizing federal accounts receivable, a contrac-
tor would sell its government receivables to a BRE. There is, however, a
long standing policy against recognizing the transfer of claims against the
118. This might occur because the obligor either perceives an opportunity to negotiate a
discount or has concerns about ongoing contract obligations-that is, future shipments and
warranty obligations.
119. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. While beyond the scope of this Comment, it
should be noted that there is no guarantee that a court would consider the entity purchasing
assets a BRE. The legal determination that an entity is a BRE is also a balancing test. See
Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 616.
121. See supra part II.B.2.
122. This is not to say that investment in securitized instruments is reckless. On the con-
trary, investors' familiarity with the nature of the commonly securitized receivables allows
them to make a very rational, subjective evaluation. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 611
(making subjective evaluation of risks related to sale of goods and services).
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federal government. 123 This policy 124 is designed to protect the govern-
ment from secret assignment arrangements, to prevent possible multiple
claims,12 and to block parties from accumulating claims which would
enable them to exert undue influence over government. 126 Accordingly,
an assignment of a claim against the federal government is presumed
invalid. 127
There is an exception to the antiassignment rule. During World
War II, defense contractors were having difficulty financing the projects
they had undertaken in support of the war effort.' 28 While the govern-
ment could have provided direct funding to contractors, Congress passed
legislation to induce private parties to finance contractors who supplied
goods and services to the government.' 29 The Assignment of Claims Act
of 1940 (ACA) 3° helped government contractors finance their opera-
tions by allowing them to assign federal payment obligations to a "fi-
nancing institution" to secure funding. 3' By lifting the government's
ban on assignments, the ACA opened the door to using federal payables
as a means of inducing investors to finance government contracts.'
32
B. A Valid Assignment Meets Express and Implied Requirements
1. Express requirements
To qualify as a valid assignment under the ACA, the transfer must
meet express and implied requirements. The express requirements are
fairly straightforward. The federal receivable must be (1) part of an obli-
gation where total payments exceed $1000; (2) assigned to a "financing
institution"; and (3) made to only one person, or a single party acting as
123. This policy was traced to "an act to define the Pay and Emoluments of certain Officers
of the Army, and for other Purposes. Act of July 17, 1986, ch. 200, § 14, 12 Stat. 594."
Vincent J. Belusko, Note, Government Contracts-Assignments-Federal Contracting Officer
Possesses the Requisite Authority to Waive the Requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, 41
U.S.C. § 15, and to Bind the Government to an Assignment of a Federal Contract-Tufteo v.
United States, 614 F.2d 740 (Ct. C. 1980), 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 167, 170 n.22 (1980). See
generally Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 537-39 (providing background on antiassign-
ment policy).
124. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
125. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 7, 14-15 (1990).
126. United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 291 (1952).
127. 31 U.S.C. § 3727.
128. Gilmore, supra note 75, at 218.
129. Id.
130. Ch. 779, 54 Stat. 1029 § 1 (amending antiassignment provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 203
(recodified as 31 U.S.C. § 3727) and 41 U.S.C. § 15).
131. The ACA amended the antiassignment provisions of existing law to permit assign-
ments to financing institutions. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727(c); 41 U.S.C. § 15.
132. See Gilmore, supra note 75, at 218.
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trustee for a group "participating in the transaction." ' To comply with
the express provisions of the ACA, the assignee only has to provide no-
tice to certain parties,13 4 and the assignment is perfected upon govern-
ment's receipt of proper notice. 1 35 Because government requires strict
adherence to these requirements,1 36 there are concerns about compliance
and at least one writer suggests that the notice requirement is impractical
for commercial transactions. 137 Notice, however, is a mechanical proce-
dure that is spelled out in federal regulations. 138 The ACA has always
required notice and financial institutions-with some exceptions-have
managed to comply.
133. 31 U.S.C. § 3727(a) provides that the prohibition against the assignment of claims is
lifted where the assignment is made to
a financing institution of money due or to become due under a contract providing for
payments totalling at least $1,000 when-
(1) the contract does not forbid an assignment;
(2) unless the contract expressly provides otherwise, the assignment-
(A) is for the entire amount not already paid;
(3) is made to only one party, except that it may be made to a party as agent
or trustee for more than one party participating in the financing; and
(C) may not be reassigned; and
(3) the assignee files a written notice of the assignment and a copy of the assign-
ment with the contracting official or the head of the agency, the surety on a bond on
the contract, and any disbursing official for the contract.
31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1988). Similarly, 41 U.S.C. § 15 lifts the prohibition on the assignment of
contracts where
the moneys due or to become due from the United States or from any agency or
department thereof, under a contract providing for payments aggregating $1,000 or
more, are assigned to a bank, trust company, or other financing institution, including
any Federal lending agency: Provided,
1. That in the case of any contract entered into prior to October 9, 1940, no
claim shall be assigned without the consent of the head of the department or agency
concerned;
2. That in the case of any contract entered into after October 9, 1940, no claim
shall be assigned if it arises under a contract which forbids such assignment;
3. That unless otherwise expressly permitted by such contract any such assign-
ment shall cover all amounts payable under such contract and not already paid, shall
not be made to more than one party, and shall not be subject to further assignment,
except that any such assignment may be made to one party as agent or trustee for
two or more parties participating in such financing;
4. That in the event of any such assignment, the assignee thereof shall file writ-
ten notice of the assignment together with a true copy of the instrument of assign-
ment with (a) the contracting officer or the head of his department of agency; (b) the
surety or sureties upon the bond or bonds, if any, in connection with such contact;
and (c) the disbursing officer, if any, designated in such contract to make payment.
41 U.S.C. § 15.
134. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727(c)(3); 41 U.S.C. § 15(4).
135. Reliance Ins. Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 62, 66 (1988).
136. See Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 544.
137. See Reade H. Ryan, Jr., Trade Receivables Purchases-A Primer 41 (Feb. 4, 1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
138. See 48 C.F.R. § 32.805 (1992) (providing procedure for assignment).
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Significantly, the government cannot reject a properly completed as-
signment. 13 9 As the Court of Claims stated in Produce Factors Corp. v.
United States:14°
If an assignment permitted by the [ACA] is executed by the
parties, and notice given the Government, as required by the
terms of the [ACA], nothing in the law suggests that the Gov-
ernment could arbitrarily refuse the assignment. Such action
would be in derogation of the obvious intent of Congress that
the [ACA] serve as a vehicle to encourage private financing of
Government contracts. 141
Therefore, strict adherence with the ACA's requirements is rewarded by
an unconditional recognition of an assignment.
2. Implied requirements
In addition to its express provisions, the ACA includes the implied
requirement that the proceeds of an ACA financing are used to complete
work on government contracts.1 42 Although one writer describes this
requirement as "a club in a closet... used as another reason not to pay a
contractor the government really doesn't want to pay," 4 3 the restriction
is not unreasonable. The purpose of the ACA is to finance government
contracts with private capital. 1 "I Suppose that a contractor uses the pro-
ceeds of a loan obtained under a government assignment for a
nongovernment project. Having expended those funds, the contractor
may not have sufficient funding to complete the government contract. 145
This defeats the purpose of the ACA.146 Accordingly, some restrictions
on the use of proceeds are appropriate.
139. Produce Factors Corp. v. United States, 467 F.2d 1343, 1351 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 7, 16-17 (1990); Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 590 F.2d 893, 896-97 (Ct. Cl. 1978); First Nat'l
City Bank v. United States, 548 F.2d 928, 934 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
143. Joseph H. Levie, Assignee's Rights to Proceeds of Government Contracts, N.Y. L.J.,
May 2, 1991, at 6. Notably, Mr. Levie represented the plaintiff in First National City Bank,
548 F.2d at 931. The plaintiff's claim was rejected because it did not meet the use-of-proceeds
requirement. Id. at 935.
144. Produce Factors Corp., 467 F.2d at 1348; Coleman v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 490,
496 (1962).
145. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 22 Cl. Ct. at 10.
146. This explanation for the limitation on the use of proceeds is consistent with the Court
of Claims in Coleman, 158 Ct. Cl. at 496 ("The [ACA] was designed to make funds available
to a contractor with which he could complete his government contract. If the loan is used for
another purpose, the objectives of the [ACA] are not satisfied."). Cf. First Nat'l City Bank,
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In First National City Bank v. United States, 47 the Court of Claims
restricted the ACA to a financing that "was used, or was available for
use," in the contract that gave rise to the assignment. 48 It added that
the "statutory concept is that of financing a specific government contract,
not of the financing of government contracts in general or across-the-
board, or the financing of all of a contractor's contracts as a lump.'
49
This holding seems to impose the very restrictive requirement that the
funding obtained through the assignment of receivables may only be used
to complete the contract that gave rise to those receivables. If a contrac-
tor held multiple government contracts, it seems that the contractor
would be required to enter into separate financing transactions for each
contract or, at a minimum, be required to trace the flow of funding from
each assignment to a specific contract. In practice, however, this require-
ment has been loosely construed to facilitate pooled financings such as
revolving credit agreements as long as proceeds are applied to complete
government work.150
What happens, however, if the contractor misappropriates proceeds
without the financial institution's knowledge? The Court of Claims, in
Coleman v. United States,51 while emphasizing that financings under the
ACA should be used to complete government contracts, stated that
if lending institutions know that the validity of an assignment
turns upon the use to which the funds are put, they would, to
say the least, be reluctant to rely upon the security of contract
assignments. We note, therefore, that if the loans are made di-
rectly to a contractor by a financial institution, the use to which
the funds are put will not defeat the validity of the
assignment. 152
Accordingly, a financing institution will not be penalized for a contrac-
tor's misapplication of funds unless the financial institution "had reason
548 F.2d at 934-35 (attributing use requirement to "participating in such financing" language
found in ACA).
147. 548 F.2d at 928.
148. Id. at 934.
149. Id.
150. See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1296, 1301 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(citing 97 CONG. REC. 4350 (1951)) (allowing use of "pools" for revolving credit facilities).
Notably, blanket assignments used to secure lines of credit without a showing that financing
proceeds would be used for government work have been held invalid. See Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 68 Comp. Gen. 216, 217-18 (1989).
151. 158 Ct. Cl. at 490.
152. Id. at 496.
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to know in advance that the loan proceeds could not be used in complet-
ing [government contracts]." 
15 3
This reason-to-know standard prohibits the assignment of receiv-
ables under completed contracts. 154 Stated simply, if the underlying con-
tract has been completed, the lender has reason to know that the
proceeds of a subsequent financing could not be used to complete that
contract.15 5 Therefore, an assignment under a completed contract may
be rendered invalid.1 56 Even though the court in First National City
Bank accepted the proposition that loans do not have to be tied to spe-
cific contracts, 5 7 the Comptroller General has definitively stated that "if
the proceeds of the loan secured by the assignment were not used or
available for use by the assignor in performing the contract that was as-
signed"158 the assignment would be invalid. 159 Thus, the assignment of a
receivable under a completed contract will not be valid.
This absolute bar to making a valid assignment under a completed
contract makes an ACA financing appear backwards. In financing ac-
counts receivable, a commercial enterprise generally assigns its receiv-
ables after a contract has been completed. The ACA, on the other hand,
requires that receivables must be assigned before the contract has been
completed. While this does not prevent the assignment for financing pur-
poses, 160 it may raise some additional concern about the assignor's ability
to perform. If the contractor does not perform, the obligor may not have
an obligation to pay.
153. First Nat'l City Bank, 548 F.2d at 928. Although an assignee could appoint a "dis-
bursing agent" to monitor the flow of funding, this is probably an unnecessary expense. See
Central Bank v. United States, 345 U.S. 639, 647 (1953) (stating assignee should not be re-
quired to police assignor's accounting and payment systems).
154. First Nat'l City Bank, 548 F.2d at 935.
155. Notably, an assignment that is perfected prior to contract completion remains valid
subsequent to completion. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 416 F.2d at 1302.
156. See Reconsideration of 60 Comp. Gen. 510 (1981) Involving Set-OffAuthority of Gov-
ernment When Contract Contains a "No Set-Off Clause," 62 Comp. Gen. 683, 687 (1983)
(holding assignment made after contract fully performed should make lender aware that
money will not be applied to performance of contract); cf Bamco Mach., Inc., 55 Comp. Gen.
155, 157 (1975) (invalidating assignment completed after contractor ceased operations).
157. 548 F.2d at 935.
158. 62 Comp. Gen. at 688-89 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Notably, the assignment of a receivable under an executory contract is not that unu-
sual. Building contractors frequently assign receivables under executory contracts for working
capital loans. Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a
Proposal for Reform, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1061, 1068 & n.30 (1992). In practice, there seems to
be little difference between the assignment of an account under an executory contract and the
common practice of granting a security interest in receivables arising in the future. See id. at
1068 & n.31.
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Finally, there is an issue as to whether a refinancing' 6 ' could satisfy
the use-of-proceeds requirement. The Court of Claims invalidated an as-
signment used to refinance a contractor's debt without a showing of a
direct benefit to a government project.' 62 This implies that the govern-
ment should receive some benefit from a refinancing. The simple show-
ing that a refinancing is intended to repay the debts incurred in funding a
government contract, however, may satisfy this requirement.
1 63
C. Consequences of a Valid Assignment
I began to think it was a curious kind of a government. It looked
somewhat as if they wanted to get out ofpaying .... I"
1. Assignments under the ACA, like commercial
assignments, are subject to setoff
Even if an assignment is properly completed, there is no guarantee
that the account obligor will be legally obligated to pay the assignee. A
contractor cannot use an assignment of its rights under contract to evade
its obligations or liabilities under contract. Both the common law and
the UCC protect an account debtor's payment defenses subsequent to an
assignment and, as an overriding principle, the assignee cannot succeed
to rights that are superior to those of the assignor. 65 Therefore, under
both common law and the UCC, an assignee's rights to receive payments
may be set off by claims that the obligor has against the assignor.
66
An assignee's claims against an assignor may come from two
sources: circumstances related to the contract 167 and circumstances un-
related to the contract. 68 The obligor has the right to set off claims
related to the contract at any time and has the right to set off any unre-
lated claims that "arise" or "accrue" prior to the assignment. 169 Nota-
bly, the obligor's right to setoff is not dependant upon having knowledge
161. A refinancing simply replaces existing financing with new funding.
162. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 7, 16 (1980).
163. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 590 F.2d 893, 897-98 (Ct. CI.
1978) (dictum).
164. TWAIN, supra note 1, at 42.
165. Gilmore, supra note 75, at 228. "[T]he assignee stands in the assignor's shoes." Id.
166. Id.; see U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 1 (1990).
167. The claim could be a fraud related to the contract or a performance issue.
168. This could be a performance issue on another contract, the settlement of a debt, a tort
claim, et cetera.
169. See Gilmore, supra note 75, at 228-30. An exception exists when the account debtor
waives its rights against the assignor. See U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
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of a claim or providing the assignee with any. notice at the time of the
assignment.
Government, as an account obligor, has the same general rights to
set off as any other account debtor. 170 The government can set off con-
tract-related claims 17' as well as unrelated claims if the "liability existed
at the time notice of the assignment was received even though that liabil-
ity had not yet matured so as to be due and payable." 172 Government's
setoff rights are intimidating because they extend to any government
agency,173 including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 7 4 As long as
the liability existed at the time of the assignment, the assignee takes sub-
ject to the government's claim. For example, an assignee would take sub-
ject to an IRS claim that "existed" at the time of the assignment even if
no tax lien has been ffled, 175 no notice of assessment has been issued,
176
and the assignee had no knowledge of the claim.
17 7
170. Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 548 ("As a general rule, the government pos-
sesses the same right as any other creditor to offset claims.") (footnote omitted); see also Prior-
ity between a Federal Tax Lien and an Assignment Under a Government Contract, 60 Comp.
Gen. 510, 515 (1981) ("[U]nder our theory of the assignment... [assignor] cannot transfer a
greater right against the government than he possessed at [the time of assignment].").
171. 31 U.S.C. § 3727(d)(2) (1988) (stating no-setoff protection does not include "an
amount that may be collected or withheld under, or because the assignor does not comply
with, the contract"); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (noting no-setoff protection "does not include
amounts which may be collected or withheld from the assignor in accordance with or for
failure to comply with the terms of the contract"); see also Industrial Bank v. United States,
424 F.2d 932, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating assignee is not entitled to "funds if needed by the
Government to complete the contract").
172. 48 C.F.R. § 32.803(e) (1992). This has been interpreted to be consistent with the com-
mon-law right to set off claims that "arise" as of the time of the assignment.
[G]overnment is entitled to set off against the [assignee] any of its claims against the
[assignor] which had matured prior to the assignment.... However, under the com-
mon law applicable to assignments, debts of the assignor which mature after an as-
signment is made may not be set off against payments otherwise due the assignee.
Cascade Reforestation, Inc., 56 Comp. Gen. 499, 503 (1977).
173. Note that the drafters of the Code of Federal Regulations used the term "Govern-
ment" and not "Agency." 48 C.F.R. 32.803(e). The government sees itself as a "unit" and the
contractor is perceived as doing business with the entire government and not just a particular
agency. 60 Comp. Gen. at 513.
174. See, e.g., 56 Comp. Gen. at 503 (citing South Side Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,
221 F.2d 813, 814 (7th Cir. 1957)).
175. Arguably, a tax claim should only have priority if the tax lien was perfected prior to a
filing that perfected the assignment. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
176. An IRS claim may not arise until an assessment letter is posted because a tax lien does
not arise before "demand." See I.R.C. § 6321 (1991). Formerly, the Comptroller General
gave priority to a tax claim as of the date of the assessment letter. See 56 Comp. Gen. at 503.
177. 60 Comp. Gen. at 512-13.
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2. Government, like a commercial obligor,
can waive its rights to setoff
As a practical matter, no asset-based financier wants exposure to an
obligor's right to setoff. An open-ended setoff right makes an assigned
asset impossible to value. Therefore, organizations that use their receiv-
ables to secure funding will typically get account debtors to waive their
rights to assert defenses against the assignee.171 Similarly, government
contractors can protect assignees by obtaining a no-setoff commitment in
their contracts.1 79 The no-setoff commitment provides that the govern-
ment cannot reduce its payment obligation for (1) any of the contractor's
liabilities that arise independently of the contract and (2) selected liabili-
ties that are contract-related.
1 80
Rather than stepping into the assignor's shoes, a no-setoff commit-
ment improves an assignee's position relative to the assignor.18 1 For ex-
ample, though federal law provides that "[a] claim against the United
States shall be forfeited to the United States by any person who corruptly
practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States,"'8 2
a no-setoff commitment has protected the innocent assignee from the
178. See U.C.C. § 9-206 cmt. 1. An account debtor's agreement not to assert defenses
against an assignee is not a waiver of its claims against the assignor.
179. 48 C.F.R. § 32.803(d).
180. This includes fines, penalties, fees, taxes, and withholding taxes. Id. § 32.804.
181. See Franklin E. Penny Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 668, 679 (Ct. Cl. 1975) ("[T]his
protection against a diminution in contract proceeds is a limited benefit and one that runs
exclusively to the assignee."). With regard to specific protections, the Federal Acquisition
Regulation provides
(a) No payments made by the Government to the assignee under any contract
assigned in accordance with the [ACA] may be recovered on account of any liability
of the contractor to the Government. This immunity of the assignee is effective
whether the contractor's liability arises from or independently of the assigned con-
tract.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) below, the inclusion of a no-setoff com-
mitment in an assigned contract entitles the assignee to receive contract payments
free of reduction or setoff for-
(1) Any liability of the contractor to the Government arising independently of
the contract; and
(2) Any of the following liabilities of the contractor to the Government arising
from the assigned contract:
(i) Renegotiation under any statute or contract clause.
(ii) Fines.
(iii) Penalties, exclusive of amounts that may be collected or withheld from the
contractor under, or for failure to comply with, the terms of the contract.
(iv) Taxes or social security contributions.
(v) Withholding or nonwithholding of taxes or social security contributions.
48 C.F.R. § 32.804 (1992).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1988).
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fraudulent acts of the assignor.18 3 A no-setoff commitment also protects
against federal tax claims.184 In sharp contrast to contracts without a
no-setoff commitment, even where an assignment takes place after a tax
lien arises, the assignee's rights are not subject to setoff."i 5 Under the
plain language of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, this protection ex-
tends to any federal claim including those for withholding, wage under-
payments, and pension obligations." 6
Because the government's no-setoff protection is limited with regard
to performance-related claims,18 7 it may appear that a private account
debtor could offer an assignee greater protection through waiver. The
UCC allows a party to waive "any claim or defense." ' 8 This difference,
though, does not hold much practical significance. First, it is not entirely
clear that the UCC intended to allow an obligor 8 9 to waive performance-
related defenses under Article 2.190 Second, individual jurisdictions may
183. Chelsea Factors, Inc. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 685, 690 (Ct. Cl. 1960) ("we see
no reason why a banker, or those for whom he acts in financing a Government contract,
should forfeit their security because of fraudulent acts of another person in which they did not
participate."); see also United States v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. (In re Gulf Apparel Corp.),
140 B.R. 593, 598 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (holding that fraud in inducement will not impair as-
signee's rights where contract has been properly performed). Even where a contract does not
contain a no-setoff commitment, courts have been reluctant to set off against an innocent as-
signee. See Arlington Trust Co. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 817, 819 (Ct. Cl. 1951) ("[M]e
think it could not have been intended by Congress that the bank which loaned the money
should take the risk that its collateral might, in an instant, be rendered worthless by the act of
the contractor in committing fraud.").
184. 48 C.F.R. § 32.804(b)(2)(iv)-(v).
185. Priority to Contract Proceeds, 65 Comp. Gen. 554 (1986); Reconsideration of 60
Comp. Gen. 510 (1981) Involving Set-Off Authority of Government When Contract Contains
a "No Set-Off Clause," 62 Comp. Gen. 683 (1983); cf. supra notes 172-79 and accompanying
text.
186. See 48 C.F.R. § 32.804(b)(1) (stating protection extends to "[a]ny liability of the con-
tractor to the Government"). Nothing prevents the government from asserting its claim
against the assignor.
187. See 48 C.F.R. § 32.804(b). Note that the regulation uses the term "loan." Id.
§ 32.804(c)(1). Since securitization is a sale of assets and not a loan, it is arguable that the
securitized financings do not qualify for no-setoff protections. It appears, however, that this
wording is merely an oversight as no-setoff protection is available to factoring transactions.
See the general discussion infra part IV.A., noting that the ACA is not limited to lending
transactions.
188. U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
189. The account obligor would be a buyer of goods. Although the UCC does not apply to
the sale of services, U.C.C. § 9-318 does not materially change prior law. Id. § 9-319 cmt. 1.
190. See U.C.C. § 9-206 cmt. 3 ("[W]arranty rules for sales are applicable."). It would be
unconscionable to obligate a purchaser to pay the purchase price of goods that were never
delivered or for which performance was wholly unacceptable. Contra id. § 3-305 cmt. 2 (stat-
ing that buyer's fraud defense arising from nondelivery cannot be asserted against holder in
due course). Even though the UCC protects the "holder in due course," plaintiffs have pre-
vailed under a theory that the financing intermediary was "too intimately involved" in the
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have legislation that invalidates such waivers. 19' Third, it is unlikely that
a sophisticated commercial purchaser would waive its defenses without a
reasonable assurance of performance.1 92 For these reasons, the protec-
tions of a no-setoff commitment are, at a practical level, at least as good
as the protections available under a commercial waiver. Given a no-set-
off commitment's broad protection against government action, the as-
signee of a federal claim is arguably better off than its commercial
counterpart.
No-setoff commitments should be available for a large number of
contracts.193 Although the ACA states that this protection is only avail-
able in time of war or national emergency, 94 the statute provides that a
national emergency applies for all Department of Defense contracts"9
and the Federal Acquisition Regulation stipulates that "there should be
special considerations to justify a determination that exclusion of a no-
setoff commitment is in the Government's interest."' 196 Therefore, there
could be as much as $150 billion of receivables with no-setoff protection
generated annually. 9
In summary, government accounts receivable, like commercial and
consumer receivables, are subject to setoff. Despite setoff, accounts re-
ceivable continue to be used to secure financings. While the assignment
of government receivables raises some unique issues, there is reason to
transaction to be considered a mere holder in due course and, as a result, free of defenses or
counterclaims. See Gilmore, supra note 75, at 231 n.29.
191. For example, before the adoption of the Commercial Code in California, state law
invalidated any waiver of defense. See CAL. COM. CODE § 9206 cmt. 2 (West 1993). Admit-
tedly, state law may focus on protecting consumers and leave commercial parties to negotiate
as they will. See id.
192. Admittedly this assurance might be as simple as trusting in the assignor's business
reputation.
193. No-setoff commitments have been used in purchase contracts for a wide variety of
goods and services. See, eg., Fine Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 328 F.2d 419, 422 (2d Cir.
1964) (involving Air Force nurses' uniforms); First Nat'l City Bank v. United States, 548 F.2d
928, 931 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (involving preparation and update of Navy technical manuals); Frank-
lin E. Penny Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 668, 671 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (involving shock mounts
for Terrier missile containers); Priority to Contract Proceeds, 65 Comp. Gen. 554, 555 (1986)
(involving construction of swimming pool for Army Corps of Engineers); Reconsideration of
60 Comp. Gen. 510 (1981) Involving Set-Off Authority of Government When Contract Con-
tains a "No Set-Off Clause," 62 Comp. Gen. 683 (1983) (involving trucking services for U.S.
Army); Bamco Machine, Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 155 (1975) (involving 160 "air flasks" for U.S.
Navy).
194. 31 U.S.C. § 3727(d) (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
195. See 50 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).
196. See 48 C.F.R. § 32.803(d) (emphasis added); see also 65 Comp. Gen. at 555 n.1 (stat-
ing no-setoff authorization was extended "because of its importance in financing government
contracts").
197. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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prefer transactions involving government accounts. Fundamentally, the
government obligor will not default.
IV. FEDERAL AccouNTs RECEIVABLE CAN BE SECURITIZED
A. Securitization, Like Factoring, Is an Acceptable Form of Financing
Under the ACA
The ACA was intended "to encourage the participation of banks in
the financing of Government contractors." ' General discussions of "fi-
nancing" tend to focus on banks or lending199 and this, in turn, suggests
that the ACA might be narrowly tailored to facilitate bank lending.
Even the Federal Acquisition Regulation refers to financing in the con-
text of lending.2°° Therefore, it might be assumed that the ACA only
applies to bank lending and excludes other forms of financing.
Lending, however, is not the only way to finance government con-
tracts. As opposed to taking a loan, a contractor can factor its accounts
receivable. In factoring, a contractor sells its accounts to a third party, a
"factor," in exchange for cash.201 This can be distinguished from lending
where accounts are pledged as collateral for a loan. Notably, govern-
ment contractors have been factoring their accounts receivable since the
ACA was enacted 2 2 and factoring is recognized as an acceptable form of
financing under the ACA.
20 3
Account securitization closely resembles factoring. Like factoring,
securitization involves the purchase and assignment of accounts. The
only real difference between the two techniques is the manner in which
account purchases are funded. 2' The factor already has the funding to
purchase accounts whereas the BRE in securitization sells securities to
198. See Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 539 (quoting S. REP. No. 217, 82d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1414) (emphasis added).
199. See id. at 535-36 (discussing ACA in context of lending); Gilmore, supra note 75, at
218 (explaining origin of ACA in terms of banks and lending).
200. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 32.804(c)(1) (1992) (stating no-setoff commitment does not ex-
tend to situations where assignee has not made a "loan").
201. See Coenen, supra note 160, at 1066 & n.19, 1067-68.
202. The ACA was enacted in October 1940 and as early as January 1941 the Comptroller
General made it clear that factoring was an acceptable form of financing under the ACA. See
20 Comp. Gen. 415, 417-18 (1941) (discussing Municipal Factors Co.).
203. See Scarborough v. Berkshire Fine Spinning Assocs., 128 F. Supp. 948, 951 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) ("The legislative history of the Federal Assignment of Claims Act shows that a factor is
a financing agent within the meaning of the word as used in the [ACA]."); Alanthus Peripher-
als, Inc., 54 Comp. Gen. 80, 83 (1974) (recognizing validity of financing "effected through the
purchase and assignment of accounts receivable").
204. While Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 20, suggests that the factor always assumes serv-
icing, this is not accurate. See Coenen, supra note 160, at 1066-68.
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fund a specific purchase.2 °5 Because these two forms of financing are so
closely related, it has been suggested that the term "securitization" is
only used to avoid the negative connotations of factoring.20 6 Given this
close similarity, it appears that securitization, like factoring, would be an
acceptable form of private financing, provided that a given transaction
otherwise met the express and implied requirements of the ACA.
B. A Bankruptcy Remote Entity Can Be a 'Tinancing Institution"
While securitization is, in concept, acceptable, a given transaction
must still conform to the ACA's requirements. Under the ACA, a gov-
ernment claim must be assigned to a financing institution. Securitization
requires that the assignment is made to a BRE.2 °7 This raises the issue of
whether a BRE can qualify as a financing institution. In defining a fi-
nancing institution, the Comptroller General has said that
the term "financing institution" was not meant to include every
business organization that might find it convenient or necessary
in the course of its business dealings to extend credit ....
Rather, a "financing institution" may be defined in a general
way as an individual, partnership, or corporation dealing in
money as distinguished from other commodities as a primary
function of its business activity.
20 8
Whether an entity meets the definition of a financing institution,
therefore, is really determined by the function of that entity. An entity
that extends credit in support of its sales operations may not qualify as a
valid assignee.2"9 Though it "deals in money," its operation may be
viewed as incidental to the manufacturing or distributing activities of its
parent. This presents a hurdle to wholly owned finance subsidiaries of
manufacturing corporations2 0 if their financing activities are viewed as
incidental to the manufacturing operation. This also presents a hurdle to
leasing companies, which might be viewed as "equipment dealers" as op-
205. -Given that the BRE's investors fund a specific purchase and the factor's investors fund
the factor's purchases generally, it is questionable whether this difference is substantive.
206. See Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 20.
207. Issues such as taxes, credit enhancement, and management requirements will influence
the choice of this vehicle.
208. Assignment of Contract Payments-Interpretation of Term "Financing Institution,"
22 Comp. Gen. 44, 45-46 (1942).
209. Id. at 46.
210. It is hard to justify why a third-party factor can qualify as a financing institution while
a wholly owned subsidiary could not. The profit that a factor extracts for its services could be
used to reduce a manufacturer's costs. It appears that this distinction actually costs the gov-
ernment money.
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posed to "money dealers." '211 In fact, with limited exceptions, leasing
companies would not qualify as financing institutions.212
Although there are some obstacles to having a BRE qualify as a
financing institution, these obstacles are not insurmountable. Princi-
pally, the BRE should be formed as an independent organization and not
as an instrument of a parent organization. Provided that the BRE is an
independently owned organization, which sells no merchandise and
holds itself out to the public as being in the business of extending credit,
it is likely that the BRE will qualify.213
C. Investors, Individually, Do Not Have to Be "Financing Institutions"
It is clear that the ACA allows multiple party financings, but it is
questionable whether investors, who hold the BRE's securities, must also
qualify as "financing institutions." While the ACA prohibits multiple
assignments, it permits assignments to a single party acting as a trustee
or agent for a number of parties participating in the financing.21 4 There-
fore, following the model for securitization,21 5 federal accounts receiva-
ble could be sold to a BRE, which would fund the purchase by selling
securities to a large number of investors.
The ACA is not clear, however, as to whether the "parties partici-
pating in the financing" 216 also need to be "financing institutions." The
Comptroller General has, however, validated an assignment of federal
lease payments to a bank acting as a trustee for bondholders.21 7 Noting
that ineligible assignees could not evade the ACA by designating a bank
211. The Comptroller General does not view "leasing" as equivalent to "financing." See
Sanco Leasing Corp., 1991 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 1549, at *5 (noting Sanco listed "leasing"
as its primary business purpose and not "financing").
212. Compare id. (leasing subsidiary is not financial institution) with Alanthus Peripherals,
Inc. 54 Comp. Gen. 80, 84 (1974) (allowing leasing company to qualify as financing institution
because rapid product obsolescence in computer peripheral industry does not favor govern-
ment purchasing such equipment). Notably, the Comptroller General may have been more
willing to recognize the assignment in Alanthus since the arrangement was perceived to con-
tribute to the performance of the government contract. 54 Comp. Gen. at 83.
213. Id. (distinguishing case from 20 Comp. Gen. 415 (1941)). Naturally, the structure of a
BRE must be consistent with other requirements of law. For instance, it might be desirable to
select a trust as a BRE because trusts are expressly recognized as a financing institution under
the ACA. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). Even so, it would be important for the trust to
qualify as a business trust as opposed to a collateral trust because only a business trust could
become a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(B)(v) (1988); In re Se-
cured Equipment Trust of Eastern Airlines, 153 B.R. 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
214. 31 U.S.C. § 3727(a)(2)(B) (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 15(3) (1988).
215. See supra part II.A.1.
216. These would be investors in a securitized transaction.
217. See Birmingham Trust National Bank, 52 Comp. Gen. 462, 465 (1973).
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trustee, the Comptroller General has explained that when the benefi-
ciaries acted as a group to provide financing to a government project,
they would be a financing institution under the ACA.21 8 Similarly, inves-
tors who purchase securities backed by federal assignments would not
need to qualify as financing institutions provided that the investors, as a
group, acted to finance a government project.2
1 9
D. Securitization Is Consistent with the ACA
It cannot be said that the ACA contemplated the securitization of
federal accounts receivable. The ACA became effective in 1940,220 and
securitization did not become popular until the federal government pro-
moted the development of mortgage-backed securities in the 1970s.22
The ACA's text, however, is not limited to financing techniques that
were popular in 1940 and the ACA is not limited to lending transactions.
Securitized offerings, like factoring transactions, can be structured to
conform with the express and implied requirements of the ACA.
Securitization is also consistent with the principles behind the ACA.
The Supreme Court has noted that "the [ACA] should be construed so as
to carry out the purpose of Congress to encourage the private financing
of government contracts. '222 Securitization invites the participation of a
broad field of private investors. The Court of Claims has interpreted the
ACA as "intend[ing] to facilitate the financing of Government contracts
by private capital in the way in which private capital normally operates
in financing the country's economy., 223 Given that government is al-
ready a large presence in the securitization market and it continues to
develop programs that endorse the use of securitization,224 it is hard to
218. Id.; Russel, 50 Comp. Gen. 613 (1971).
219. Furthermore, it would not appear that secondary market trading of securitized inter-
ests would violate the prohibition against multiple assignments. First, in securitization, there
is only one assignment-from the contractor to the bankruptcy remote entity. Second, 52
Comp. Gen. 462 expressly authorized the assignment to a bank as trustee for bondholders.
Bonds are negotiable, so the Comptroller General's validation of this assignment implies that
secondary market trading would not be a violation of the prohibition on multiple assignments.
220. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
221. Schwarcz, supra note 21, at 609.
222. Central Bank v. United States, 345 U.S. 639, 646 (1953).
223. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1296, 1302 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(quoting Chelsea Factors, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 685, 690 (Ct. Cl. 1960)).
224. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Government National Mort-
gage Association either issue or provide guarantees for a large volume of securitized offerings.
FIRST BOSTON, HANDBOOK OF SECURITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT & FED-
ERAL AGENCIES & RELATED MONEY MARKET INSTRUMENTS 92 (34th ed. 1990). Notably,
there has been considerable legislative attention paid to creating a federally sponsored agency
to securitize small business loans. See Legislative Proposals to Facilitate the Small Business
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believe that Congress intended to penalize contractors by prohibiting
them from taking advantage of this widely-used financing tool.22 5 Fun-
damentally, the ACA is not intended to penalize contractors for doing
business with the federal government.2 26
V. FAST-BACKS Do REQUIRE THOUGHTFUL-STRUCTURING
Although the ACA permits securitization of federal accounts receiv-
able, compliance with the ACA will not guarantee an investment market
for FAst-BackS. To promote the marketability of FAst-BackS, issuers
need to immunize investors against the risks that are inherent in these
transactions.
A. Not All Federal Accounts Receivable Are Created Equal:
Setoff Impacts Investment Quality
While it is appealing to think of FAst-BackS as federally-backed se-
curities, setoff implies that a government receivable is only as good as the
performance of the contracting party. This makes the contractor, and
not the account obligor, the primary source of risk in FAst-BackS. The
degree to which investors are impacted by the contractor's performance
is determined by the terms of the contract that govern the assignment.
There is less risk in a contract with a no-setoff commitment than there is
in a contract that does not contain a no-setoff commitment.227 While the
presence or absence of a no-setoff commitment might not be the only
factor in deciding whether a transaction is feasible,2 28 it should be an
important consideration in structuring transactions.
For example, although assignments arising from contracts that con-
tain no-setoff commitments offer the greatest legal protection, the right to
Loan Incentive Act of 1993: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1993) [hereinafter Propos-
als] (Statement of Patricia A. Jehle); S. REP. No. 169, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993) (encour-
aging securitization of small business loans).
225. Securitization has been called "one of the most significant financial innovations of the
last twenty years." Shenker & Colleta, supra note 18, at 1371 & n.4 (listing multiple sources in
support of this statement).
226. Central Bank v. United States, 345 U.S. 639, 643 (1953).
227. A discussion of setoff appears supra part III.C.1.-2.
228. For example, compliance with the ACA is not an absolute prerequisite to securitizing
federal accounts because disputes between private parties would be determined under state
law. The drawback for noncompliance, however, is that the federal government will not recog-
nize a noncomplying assignment. Therefore, the assignee's right to receive payment will bear a
higher degree of bankruptcy and setoff risk. While noncomplying assignments may not be
ideal, a transaction could be feasible if the assignor-contractor had financial health, a good
reputation for performance, and the transaction compensated investors for this subjective risk
through either a higher level of credit enhancement or a higher investment yield.
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collect on that receivable is still subject to the performance risks related
to the underlying contract. Notwithstanding the fact that a contract to
provide an advanced weapons system to the Air Force would carry no-
setoff protection, it might be more desirable to securitize receivables aris-
ing from a contract to provide pink erasers to the General Accounting
Office which does not have setoff protection. The lower level of perform-
ance risk attributable to the delivery of pink erasers could compensate for
the lack of setoff protection. Naturally, contracts which have both low
performance risk and setoff protection-for example, providing drab
green t-shirts to the Army-would be the most attractive candidates for
securitization. Consequently, as an issuer considers securitizing federal
accounts receivable, it should balance considerations such as the setoff
protections offered by the contract, the contractor's financial health, the
contractor's reputation for performance, and the difficulty in performing
the underlying contract to arrive at an appropriate structure.
In considering how transactions may be brought to market, it seems
that FAst-BackS, like any other receivables transaction, could be struc-
tured as a note or commercial paper program. 229 A given program could
accommodate single or multiple sellers of receivables. 230 Due to the
unique issues impacting FAst-BackS, however, it may be preferable to
develop multiple seller programs, structuring FAst-BackS with pools of
receivables purchased from several contractors. A "conduit," represent-
ing multiple sellers and multiple contracts, reduces performance risks
through diversification.23'
Aside from diversification, there are other advantages to a multiple
seller program. Instead of being controlled by a single contractor, a con-
duit would be organized and administered by a third-party sponsor.232
Given that these transactions are sophisticated, an independent, third-
party sponsor would increase investor confidence in the due diligence,
asset selection, and structuring process. Furthermore, an independently
owned financing conduit appears to be more like a "financing institu-
tion" 233 as defined by the ACA. For these reasons, a multiple seller con-
229. Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 164.
230. Id.
231. For example, if a pool of receivables represents multiple contracts, the transaction is
less dependant upon an individual contract within that pool. Given that the top 200 govern-
ment contractors share $80 billion of purchases, Top 200 Government Contractors, GOVERN-
MENT EXECUTIVE, Aug. 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File, it appears
that the industry is sufficiently diversified to support a conduit program.
232. A third-party sponsor would be responsible for organizing and administering the
securitization program on behalf of several originators.
233. See supra part IV.B.
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duit may be more attractive than a single issuer program because the
conduit's operation hedges against FAst-BackS inherent risks.
B. Competing Priorities Could Be Determined Under Federal or State
Law; The Assignee Protects Itself By Perfecting Under Both
1. The ACA does not determine disputes between private parties
Compliance with the ACA does not guarantee the assignee's rights
against other parties. The ACA is for the convenience of the govern-
ment:234 "Its focus is not on the perfection of liens and security interests,
but rather the establishment of procedural requirements of assignees
planning to assert claims against the government."23 Thus, an assignee
must still comply with state law to ensure that its interest in purchased
receivables will be valid against private third parties.236 Federal accounts
receivable should be accounts under the UCC because they represent a
"right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered...
whether or not it has been earned by performance.' 237 Consequently, to
protect the assignee against private interests, a securitization of federal
obligations should comply with UCC Article 9.238
2. State law may not always determine priorities
between private parties
Where a priority dispute involving a federal receivable is strictly be-
tween private parties, state law will probably govern.2 39 If, on the other
hand, a dispute involves the government, there is no guarantee that state
law will apply.2" The Comptroller General has taken the position that
234. See Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 548.
235. In re Robert E. Derecktor, Inc., 142 B.R. 29 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).
236. Cf Priority between a Federal Tax Lien and an Assignment under a Government
Contract, 60 Comp. Gen. 510, 513 (1981) ("The Comptroller General does not express any
position on whether the assignment of a claim under a Government contract should be viewed
as perfected without filing in accordance with State law when the dispute only involves com-
peting private claims.").
237. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1990).
238. Note that UCC § 9-104(a) states that Article 9 does not apply "to [an] interest subject
to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties
to and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property." Id. § 9-104(a).
Taken literally, Article 9 should not apply. However, Official Comment 1 to UCC § 9-104
explains that the UCC should not apply to the extent that federal statute governs: "Thus if the
federal statute contained no relevant provision, [Article 9] could be looked to for an answer."
Id. cmt. 1.
239. In re Palmetto Pump & Irrigation, Inc., 81 B.R. 109, 112 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
240. See Ambassador Factors, Div. Fleet Factors Corp. v. First Am. Bulk Carrier Corp.
(In re Topgallant Lines, Inc.), 125 B.R. 682, 688-91 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991) (discussing appli-
cability of state law under different levels of federal involvement).
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the provisions of the UCC are preempted by the ACA as far as the gov-
ernment is concerned.241 "If the contracting agency is bound to ac-
knowledge the assignment, a sister agency may not disavow it." '242 Even
if an assignee fails to perfect a claim under state law, a properly com-
pleted assignment will continue to be valid against any government
agency.
243
The split between applying state and federal rules creates priority
problems when a dispute involves both private parties and the govern-
ment. Suppose that an assignee of a federal account under a no-setoff
commitment properly complies with the ACA but does not perfect its
interest under state law. Consider the priority conflict when a tax lien
arises prior to the assignment and some other creditor obtains a perfected
interest in the accounts subsequent to the assignment. Under state law,
the tax lien would have priority under the general first-in-time principle.
Under the ACA, however, the assignee has priority because the assign-
ment is valid against the government. On the other hand, the creditor
should prevail because it perfected its interest under state law and the
assignee did not. Still, it was already decided that the government's tax
lien was superior to the creditor's lien. Who should win? If the ACA
does not decide the dispute between the assignee and the creditor, the
creditor will prevail at the government's expense. In the absence of a
clear governing doctrine, 2' it is hard to tell when government's interest
in the outcome will be strong enough to warrant the setting aside of
state-created priorities.
An interesting question also arises as to whether the ACA deter-
mines the rights between private parties under bankruptcy proceedings.
As Congress controls both the right to assign claims and bankruptcy ad-
judication, it seems that bankruptcy courts should protect the federal as-
signee against private creditors" even if the assignee has not perfected
its interest under state law. In Cascade Reforestation, Inc. ,246 the Comp-
troller General stated that where "the assignee has filed its assignment
... in accordance with the Assignment of Claims Act ... it will have
perfected the assignment to the extent that the assignment cannot be at-
241. 60 Comp. Gen. at 513.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Rather than "giving up" its position, perhaps courts should preserve government's
position for the benefit of the assignee in the same way that the Bankruptcy Code preserves an
avoidable lien for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
245. Naturally, the bankruptcy court could still avoid the transfer if it was a preference.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547.
246. 56 Comp. Gen. 499 (1977).
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tached by the trustee in bankruptcy."'247 The Comptroller General, how-
ever, relied on Scarborough v. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates2 48 to
reach that decision. Although the Scarborough court suggested that an
ACA filing was sufficient to protect against a bankruptcy trustee, New
York did not require filing to perfect the assignment of an account re-
ceivable at that time.249 Moreover, federal bankruptcy power must be
distinguished from "the adjudication of state-created private rights.
250
Given that the ACA is not supposed to determine priorities between pri-
vate parties, 25 1 it also seems reasonable that the ACA should not be
given greater weight in a bankruptcy forum. Again, without a clear doc-
trine, it is difficult to say when federal rules will govern.
3. Government may not recognize the assignment
A valid assignment must meet the ACA's express and implied re-
quirements. While the government cannot reject a properly completed
assignment,252 there is always some risk that the government will contest
the validity of an assignment.25 3 An assignment's validity impacts inves-
tors in two ways. First, an invalid assignment will not carry any protec-
tions of the ACA.254 Without ACA protection, there is greater risk that
the receivable will be set off against other obligations. Second, if the gov-
ernment determines that an assignment is invalid, it will continue to pay
the assignor. As long as the assignor takes possession of these payments,
the investor has increased exposure to the assignor's bankruptcy. While
there may be little that an assignee can do to protect against the loss of
the ACA's protection,255 the assignee can, at minimum, protect its inter-
247. Id. at 503-04.
248. 128 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
249. Id. at 951.
250. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982).
251. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
252. Produce Factors Corp. v. United States, 467 F.2d 1343, 1351 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
253. See, e.g., supra note 143 and accompanying text.
254. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 590 F.2d 893, 897 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
255. The potential loss of statutory protection may be less troublesome to an assignment-
based lender because a lender may take other recourse. In securitization, however, the under-
lying accounts are being sold. Recourse is not suited to securitization because it makes the
transaction look more like a loan and less like a true sale. See supra note 55 and accompany-
ing text. Although the presence of recourse does not preclude a legal sale, see Major's Furni-
ture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544 (3d Cir. 1979), it also makes investors
more reliant on the seller's credit instead of the asset's credit. It would be impractical to
substitute a different form of credit enhancement for seller recourse because it is impossible to
value an appropriate level of enhancement for unforeseeable claims. See supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the securitization of federal accounts receivable might be re-
stricted to transactions involving issuers whose financial health and reputation for performance
limit performance-related concerns. This may not be a particularly burdensome constraint
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est subject to government claims and defenses. By perfecting its interest
under state law, the assignee protects its interest in the funds that the
256assignor receives.
Summarizing, it is possible that a priority dispute involving a federal
receivable will be determined under state law because the government
found reason to invalidate the assignment.25 7 Additionally, if a priority
dispute is between private parties, there is a "good chance" that the dis-
pute will also be determined under state law.2" 8 Therefore, in structuring
financing transactions, even though perfection under the ACA protects
an assignment against the government, the assignee maximizes its protec-
tion by perfecting the assignment under both the ACA and state law.
25 9
C. A Properly Structured FAst-BackS Offering Would Be Competitive
with Commercial and Consumer Receivable-Backed Offerings
1. Federal accounts receivable are
suitable for securitization
The government has an interest in protecting its relationship with
private industry because it needs a source of goods and services to per-
form its functions. Contractors do business with the government because
there is an opportunity for profit. Although federal agencies may be "no-
toriously slow payers, ' 260 they eventually pay their bills. If government
did not pay, there would not be a government contracting industry.
Given that the assignment of federal accounts receivable has been used to
secure funding for the past fifty years, 26' it appears that federal accounts
are valuable assets.262
because account securitization, as a technique, is already sensitive to an issuer's and servicer's
credit and performance characteristics. See supra notes 43-44, 114, 116-18 and accompanying
text.
256. This circumstance is similar to the situation faced by an intended assignee when a
court determines that the proposed sale of an account does not qualify as a true sale. See supra
part II.B.1.
257. Reconsideration of 60 Comp. Gen. 510 (1981) Involving Set-Off Authority of Govern-
ment When Contract Contains a "No Set-Off Clause," 62 Comp. Gen. 683, 686 (1983).
258. See Arthur Pew Constr. Co. v. Lipscomb, 965 F.2d 1559, 1576 (11th Cir. 1992).
259. See Freeman v. Ritner, 489 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1973). Notably, these results are
not dramatically different from commercial and consumer securitization transactions which
are perfected under state law in the event that the underlying assignment does not qualify as a
true sale. See Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 262 (MBNA credit card
prospectus).
260. Fraser, supra note 6, at 43.
261. See 41 U.S.C. § 15(2) (1988) (stating effective date).
262. Apparently, this practice predates the use of assignments in commercial finance. Pro-
fessor Gilmore credits the ACA for popularizing assignment-based financings in private indus-
try. Gilmore, supra note 75, at 218.
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In addition to being valuable assets, the assignment of a federal ac-
count receivable favors true sale treatment.263 Noting that there is no
way to guarantee that a legal sale has occurred,2 4 government has al-
ways interpreted the "assignment of a claim on a Government contract
as an outright and absolute sale of all of the assignor's rights and prop-
erty interest under the contract, and not as a more limited transfer of a
security interest. '2 6' Although the ACA leaves the adjudication of
rights between private parties to state law,266 the state should have rela-
tively small interest in who possesses title provided that the transfer is
perfected under state law. The federal government, however, does have
an interest in protecting the true sale characterization since it facilitates
the financing of government contracts. Therefore, government's interest
in encouraging private financing should support treating the assignment
of an account under the ACA as a true sale and it may make such a
characterization possible in spite of a state law prohibition. In short,
federal accounts receivable are not only valuable assets, but they may be
particularly suited to securitization because the assignment of a federal
account favors true sale treatment.267
2. Credit risks associated with FAst-BackS are comparable to
commercial and consumer offerings
Unlike other forms of securitization, there is no borrower risk for
FAst-BackS because the government will not default.268 In this regard,
FAst-BackS have an advantage over other transactions because commer-
cial entities and consumers can default.26 9 Still, there is an important
distinction to be drawn between a federally backed security and a federal
assignment-backed security. Federal securities are a direct obligation,
whereas FAst-BackS represent account obligations. Direct obligations
are unconditional whereas account obligations are subject to payment
defenses. These defenses arise from the contractor's failure to perform.
263. A true sale to a BRE provides the primary source of bankruptcy protection in securi-
tized transactions. See supra part II.B.1.
264. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
265. Priority between a Federal Tax Lien and Assignment Under a Government Contract,
60 Comp. Gen. 510, 513 (1981).
266. See supra part V.B.1.
267. It might also be mentioned that the standardization of government contracts as a re-
sult of the Federal Acquisition Regulation would also facilitate asset servicing.
268. STIGUM, supra note 2, at 38.
269. While default risks are supposed to be "diversified" away, there is no guarantee. See
Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 263 (MBNA credit card prospectus) (explaining
that social, legal, and economic factors may alter payment patterns).
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Therefore, in FAst-BackS transactions, it is the contractor-the account
seller and not the account obligor-that is the key source of risk.
Seller-related risks, however, are common to all assignment-based
financings.27° Investors in commercial and consumer receivables securi-
tization have exposure to the ongoing operations of the originator and
servicer, 271 and their rights to receive payment can be diminished
through either setoff 72 or a variety of statutory protections. 273 Commer-
cial and consumer securitization offerings are feasible because investors
subjectively accept these risks as being remote.274 While there may be
some additional concern over seller risk in FAst-BackS transactions be-
cause the receivable is assigned prior to contract completion, careful
structuring can minimize this concern. First, all federal receivables are
not created equal and the careful selection of receivables can minimize
performance-related problems.275 Second, the securitization may be re-
stricted to contractors who have good financial health and a reputation
for performance.276 Third, while the issuer must assign the receivable
prior to contract completion, the issuer might delay the assignment until
the work associated with that receivable has been performed. Fourth, in-
vestors should have fewer concerns about performance because the ACA
requires financing proceeds to be applied to contract completion.277 In
short, to the extent that FAst-BackS offerings protect investors against
seller risks, they should be comparable to commercial or consumer re-
ceivable transactions. Indeed, FAst-BackS may be more attractive be-
cause the ultimate obligor-the United States government-is not
subject to default.
270. It is questionable whether FAst-BackS have greater performance risk relative to other
receivable-backed transactions. Even so, it is arguable that even a marginally greater perform-
ance risk in FAst-BackS would be offset by the absence of credit exposure to the borrower.
271. See supra part II.C.
272. See supra part III.C.I.
273. A detailed discussion of these risks is beyond the scope of this Comment. As an exam-
ple, however, consider credit card securitization where investors have exposure to consumer
protection laws. See, e.g., Secondary Market Hearings, supra note 19, at 262. Additionally, if
a bank originated the securitized accounts, investors would also face the possibility of having
their interest subordinated under federal banking laws. Id.
274. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
275. See supra part V.A.
276. This may not be a particularly burdensome constraint because account securitization,
as a technique, is already sensitive to an issuer's and servicer's credit and performance charac-
teristics. See supra notes 43-44, 114, 116-18 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. Note that if the purchasing agency is
doing its job, the government would have established that the contractor is capable of perform-
ing before entering into the contract. To some degree, the government is screening the con-
tractor on behalf of investors.
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D. If FAst-BackS Are a Good Idea, Why Are No Deals Being Done?
Alexander Pope once cautioned his readers:
Be not the first by whom the new is tried
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.
With respect to [investment] practices, the first piece of advice is,
on the whole, sounder than the second.278
The ACA permits the securitization of federal accounts receivable.
Federal accounts are valuable assets and suited to securitization. Given
that securitization is a widely accepted form of financing, it is trouble-
some that a FAst-BackS market has not already developed.
1. The DynCorp transaction
There has been only one reported transaction involving the securi-
tization of federal payment obligations.27 9  In December 1991,
DynCorp28° circled281 a $100 million offering that was privately placed
by the investment banking firm of Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette.282
Because the transaction was privately placed, there is limited information
on the terms of that offering.28 3 However, it was reported that most of
the underlying receivable pool represented billables to the United States
government for work completed2 84 on military maintenance contracts.285
The notes were expected to be rated "single-A. ' 286 The financing was
structured as a note program with a five-and-one-half-year maturity,
287
so it may be assumed that the program was designed to reinvest collected
receivables to carry the program to term. Though a company official
stated that the transaction was "not technically ' 2 88 part of a refinancing,
278. Gilmore, supra note 75, at 260.
279. Search of LEXIS, News Library, Curnws and Arcnws Files (Feb. 5, 1994) (search for
record containing "government" and "receivables" and "securitization").
280. DynCorp, a provider of aircraft-related maintenance and consulting services, was
ranked as the 164th largest domestic private company in 1993. The 400 Largest Private Com-
panies in the U.S., FORBES, Dec. 6, 1993, at 170, 190.
281. To "circle" an offering is to line up investors. See Michael Liebowitz, DLJ Circles
Structured Deal Backed by Trade Receivables, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., Dec. 9, 1991, at
15.
282. Id.
283. Id. A private placement is exempt from registration under § 4(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1988).
284. Liebowitz, supra note 281.
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it was reportedly related to the company's $261.9 million leveraged
buyout.
289
According to the Investment Dealer's Digest, the deal was tough to
place.290 Reportedly, investors were concerned with (1) the govern-
ment's right to setoff and (2) the possibility that the government would
not recognize the assignment.291 It is not, however, immediately clear
why investors should have been concerned about setoff. Because these
were military contracts, the receivables should have benefitted from no-
setoff protection. As long as the underlying assignments were valid, no-
setoff protection would have prevented tax setoffs.292
Investors' concerns may have stemmed from a perception that the
government could challenge the validity of the DynCorp assignments.
Principally, the ACA requires a contractor to apply refinancing proceeds
to completing its government contracts.293 In DynCorp's circumstance,
the financing may have been too closely related to the company's lever-
aged buyout. Moreover, by pooling government accounts with commer-
cial receivables, it might be easier to characterize the transfers as a
"blanket" or "lump" assignment as opposed to a financing that is tied to
funding government projects.294  Finally, since DynCorp apparently
owned the BRE, it might not qualify as a "financing institution."
295
While these observations are speculative, these issues may have created
uncertainty in the minds of investors. In financial terms, uncertainty
translates to risk. Accordingly, investors who were unfamiliar with both
government accounts receivable and the contracting industry may have
been discouraged from participating.
2. The future for FAst-BackS
Despite reported difficulties in selling the deal, the DynCorp trans-
action is a very positive signal. DynCorp, a single-B rated issuer,296 was
able to use its accounts receivable to obtain funding at a single-A297 rate
289. Id.
290. See Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 14.
291. Id. at 19-20.
292. See supra part III.C.2.
293. It is assumed that when the company assigned receivables on completed work it was
not assigning receivables on completed contracts, which, on its own, would render the assign-
ment invalid. See supra part III.B.2.
294. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
296. Steve Quickel, The ABS Market Catches a Second Wind, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Dec. 1993, special sponsored section at 3.
297. Liebowitz, supra note 281.
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of interest.2 98 This improvement in credit quality translated into roughly
a three percent 299 savings in the interest rate that DynCorp would other-
wise have paid for financing, a cash savings of approximately three mil-
lion dollars per year.3° Investors were also rewarded; it appears that the
investment has performed.3 0' While future transactions might be more
accommodating of the financing institution and use-of-proceeds require-
ments, the DynCorp transaction proves that the concept works.
It is, however, troublesome that two years have passed since the
DynCorp transaction closed and there have been no reported subsequent
transactions. 302 The absence of a FAst-BackS market may reflect inves-
tor reluctance to participate in any transaction that allows a sometimes
arbitrary government to delay or offset payments. If investors can be
shown that the contracting industry is sound, they should be receptive to
FAst-BackS. After all, if investors will purchase "grocery-backed
bonds, 30 3 they should be willing to invest in government receivables. a°
While a FAst-BackS market has yet to emerge, the rise in commer-
cial receivables transactions suggests that a market is forthcoming. In
fact, it was recently announced that a company has been formed for the
express purpose of purchasing and securitizing federal receivables.30 5
298. As noted earlier, securitization is particularly attractive when the underlying assets
merit a higher credit rating than the selling organization. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
299. Quickel, supra note 296.
300. Considering that DynCorp earned eight million dollars in 1993, a three million dollar
savings is significant. See The 400 Largest Private Companies in the U.S., supra note 280.
301. There are no reports of any problems with this transaction. Search of LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws and Arcnws Files (Jan. 22, 1994) (search for record containing "DynCorp").
302. It was reported that DLJ attempted to market another transaction involving federal
accounts receivable for Wang Laboratories in June 1992. See Michael Liebowitz, DLJ Shops
Wang Receivables in Private Market Attempt, INVESTMENT DEALER'S DIG., June 1, 1992, at
11. A search of the LEXIS database does not confirm that such a transaction closed. Search
of LEXIS, News Library, Curnws and Arcnws Files (Jan. 22, 1994) (search for record contain-
ing "Wang").
303. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
304. Although this Comment recognizes federal account securitization as a unique market,
it is interesting to note that DLi commingled, or planned to commingle, federal receivables
with commercial receivables in both the DynCorp and proposed Wang transactions. This sug-
gests that DLJ either (I) does not distinguish federal accounts as a unique market, (2) believes
that commingling improves transaction marketability, or (3) could not accumulate a sufficient
volume of receivables to merit a separate federal offering.
305. Pearlstein & Knight, supra note 6, at A13. Although it is reported that, as of August
1993, the company, Federal National Payable, Inc., has purchased $20 million of receivables,
there is no evidence that it has placed a securitized offering. Id. It is interesting to note that in
purchasing the receivables, the company is planning to hold back 20% of the receivable's value
as credit enhancement in addition to charging an interest rate that is several points above
prime. Id. Intuitively, this appears to be a fairly "rich" deal. Therefore, one can assume that
the company is targeting smaller contractors who are having difficulty in obtaining funding.
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New players are bound to follow. Notably, the specialization associated
with government contracting suggests that some organizations have a
unique advantage in sponsoring FAst-BackS programs. While banks
with experience in lending against government receivables are an obvious
choice,30 6 nonbank financial companies with experience in securitization
and government contracting-General Electric, Chrysler, Westing-
house-are uniquely suited to developing programs.30 7 Presently, the
challenge is to develop a benchmark structure for FAst-BackS transac-
tions to drive future issuances and develop a trading market for these
securities.
VI. GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROMOTE THE SECURITIZATION OF
FEDERAL ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
A. Securitization Saves Money
Government does not borrow from banks or other financial in-
termediaries. 308 As a "default-free" borrower, 30 9 it borrows less expen-
sively through the direct sale of treasury securities in the capital
markets.310 Why, then, does government insist upon borrowing through
its suppliers? Government's obligation to pay for its purchases is a form
of borrowing. 311 Given its borrowing power, supplier-credit is an ineffi-
cient source of funding-particularly when government does business
with smaller or less creditworthy suppliers. Although the cost of this
borrowing may be hidden in the price of the goods and services
purchased,312 government still pays these costs and they can be "shock-
ingly high. ' 313 Because government agencies are "notoriously slow pay-
306. A lender might even consider securitizing its portfolio of loans secured by government
accounts receivable.
307. See, e.g., Pearlstein & Knight, supra note 6, at A12 ("The second-largest lender in the
country is... a division of General Electric ... ."). These nonbank financial companies would
be ideal as sponsors or providers of credit enhancement programs.
308. Financial intermediaries include banks, insurance companies, and other credit provid-
ers. See STIGUM, supra note 2, at 15.
309. Id. at 38.
310. This explains why corporate securities are priced as a "spread" over the government
yield curve. See MOODY'S BOND RECORD, supra note 10, at 620 (referring to graph of
"spread" between corporate composite rate and long term Treasury securities since 1946).
311. See RICHARD D. LEHMBECK, SUCCESSFUL CASH MANAGEMENT IN YOUR BUSINESS
150-51 (1984).
312. Id. at 152 (stating "vendor has undoubtedly built a financing factor into the price").
313. Chelsea Factors, Inc. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 685, 693 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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ers," 314 interest costs add up. The government, like a commercial
enterprise, should examine whether this use of credit is cost-effective.315
While federal payment practices merit examination,316 there is a
quick way for government to realize lower implied 317 interest costs. As
long as securitization provides the contractor with savings, the contract
bidding process is likely to return some portion of those savings to the
federal government. Assuming that the contracting process is competi-
tive, a contractor will use some portion of its cost savings to make itself
more attractive relative to other bidders. Therefore, the government ben-
efits from account securitization because it shares in a contractor's inter-
est savings through lower acquisition costs.
B. Securitization Supports the Prompt Payment Act
Under the Prompt Payment Act (PPA),318 Congress provided gov-
ernment agencies with incentives to pay invoices in a timely fashion.319
The PPA requires agency heads to implement policies to "foster prompt
payment to contractors" and to adopt procedures consistent with that
policy.320 To the extent that agencies fail to complete payment, they are
required to pay interest penalties.32'
Although securitization is not a perfect substitute for payment, a
contractor may view the sale of an account receivable as roughly
equivalent to payment.322 From this perspective, promoting the use of
securitization may be a more effective means of carrying out the objec-
tives of the PPA. Government agencies are not profit-oriented organiza-
tions and may be insensitive to the cost penalties implied by the PPA. As
a result, the PPA may have mandated interest penalties without effecting
a significant change in payment delinquencies. By promoting the wider
use of securitization, market forces will promote the prompt return of
capital to government contractors.
There is, however, a more compelling argument favoring securitiza-
tion. Under the PPA, the government pays the Renegotiation Board In-
314. Fraser, supra note 6, at 43.
315. LEHMBECK, supra note 311, at 152.
316. Consider the discussion of the Prompt Payment Act, infra part VI.B.
317. Financing costs are "implied" in the price of goods and services.
318. 31 U.S.C. § 3901 (1988).
319. Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 536.
320. 48 C.F.R. § 32.904 (1992).
321. 48 C.F.R. §§ 32.903, 52.232-.25(a)(3), 52.25(a)(5)-(6) (1992).
322. Once the contractor has received cash and the account receivable is off its books, it has
no reason to be concerned about whether or not the government has paid.
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terest Rate on delinquent accounts.323 This rate is calculated "by taking
into consideration current private commercial rates of interest for new
loans maturing in approximately five years. ' 324 This obligates the gov-
ernment to pay a relatively high rate of interest. For example, the Rene-
gotiation Board Interest Rate for the period July 1993 to December 1993
was set at 5.63.325 In early July, the rate on a three month Treasury bill
was 3.07% and the rate on a ten year Treasury note was 5.83%.326 In
other words, the government committed itself to pay Treasury bond rates
on what was essentially a short-term obligation. In short, economic effi-
ciency suggests that government should pay a rate of interest that more
closely approximates the period of time that government, in essence, bor-
rows the money. By establishing a program to directly reimburse con-
tractors for their costs of securitization, contractors would obtain a
prompt return of capital and government would dramatically reduce its
interest expense.327
323. 41 U.S.C. § 611 (1988); Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 564 & n.193. While the
Renegotiation Board was terminated in 1979 pursuant to Pub. L. No. 95-431, § 501, 92 Stat.
1043 (1978), the Renegotiation Board rate of interest continues to be published since several
agencies are required to use interest rates that are determined under these criteria. See Rene-
gotiation Board Interest Rate, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,511, 36,511-12 (1993).
324. Pub. L. No. 92-41, § 2 (a)(3), 85 Stat. 97 (1971).
325. Renegotiation Board Interest Rate, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,511, 36,511-12.
326. Key Interest Rates, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1993, at C20. The Renegotiation Board
Interest Rate was also high relative to commercial borrowings. Id. During that same period,
90 day commercial paper was priced at 3.19% and six month certificates of deposit were priced
at 3.35%. Id.
327. There are several creative ways in which government could develop a program. By
leaving the securitization of federal receivables completely in private hands, government could
simply reimburse contractors for verified financing costs. Alternatively, the government might
sponsor its own financing conduit. The difficulty with government sponsorship, however, is
that to the extent government guarantees the receivable-backed securities, it insures the con-
tractor's performance for investors. While investors would undoubtedly find this attractive, a
government guarantee reduces the effectiveness of government's payment defenses. To balance
government protections against investment marketability, government might choose to guar-
antee the payment of interest but not the payment of principal on sponsored securities.
A government-assisted program might be most appropriate to facilitate securitization by
smaller contractors that, for several reasons, would have greater difficulty in making use of
securitization. This would help fulfill one of the ACA's statutory objectives which is "'to
broaden the base of competitive bidders to include small companies.'" See Schooner &
Schooner, supra note 5, at 539 (quoting Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 416
F.2d 1296, 1299 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (citing H.R. REP. No. 2925, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940))).
Notably, recent legislative proposals to foster capital formation for small businesses through
loan securitization missed the opportunity to address the unique needs of the small govern-
ment contractor. See Proposals, supra note 224.
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C. There Is Room for Government Action
Government can save money though the securitization of federal ac-
counts receivable. The potential savings328 is an incentive to take action.
To promote securitization and maximize savings, government should
take steps to make FAst-BackS more marketable.
1. Minimize the difference between FAst-BackS
and government securities
Minimizing the difference between FAst-BackS and federal securi-
ties would improve marketability. Accordingly, FAst-BackS would be
priced more closely to federal securities and there would be a corre-
sponding reduction in interest costs. As the cost of FAst-BackS decline,
the incentive to securitize would increase. As contractors securitize to
realize lower interest costs, government would realize some reduction in
purchasing costs.
Minimizing the difference between FAst-BackS and government se-
curities can be accomplished by extending the setoff protections on ac-
count obligations. By shifting performance risk from the investor to
government, FAst-BackS look more like a direct obligation. Short of re-
moving all setoff defenses, the ACA could be amended to extend no-
setoff protection under circumstances where the government buyer has
less performance risk. What may be a nominal concession on govern-
ment's part could be a significant improvement in the minds of investors.
Notably, even though government would be giving up its rights against
assignees, it would preserve its rights against the assignor. In short, the
government needs to evaluate the benefit of preserving payment defenses
against assignees relative to its potential benefit from lowering acquisition
costs.
329
328. To get an idea of the savings potential, consider that the Department of Defense
spends roughly $90 billion a year on procurement. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
supra note 14. DynCorp saved 3% on its interest costs. Quickel, supra note 296. Assuming
that the defense contracting industry could earn a generous 15% net margin and realize an
average 1.5% savings through securitization, the defense contracting industry could save
roughly $100 million for each month that securitization is used to replace traditional sources
of funding.
329. Although several years old, an excellent approach to such an analysis appears in PRO-
GRAM ANALYSIS Div., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE PUB.
No. PB-281 791, FEDERAL CREDIT ASSISTANCE: AN APPROACH TO PROGRAM DESIGN AND
ANALYSIS (May 31, 1978).
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2. Simplify compliance
While the ACA is supposed to encourage private financing,33 the
ACA can be less than encouraging. Contractors and investors are more
likely to accept securitization if government removes the uncertainties in
compliance. Requirements such as notice, the use-of-proceeds, 331 and
the assignment to a "financing institution"332 should be simplified and set
out in published guidelines. While some transactions may purposefully
"push the edge of the envelope," published guidelines will give rating
agencies and investors some reference in estimating the legal risks of a
transaction.333
3. Make efficiency a priority
There is little reason to make financing available under the ACA if
that financing is not economically advantageous. In establishing guide-
lines for compliance, some of the arbitrary standards that the Comptrol-
ler General and the federal courts use to decide matters under the ACA
should be relaxed for the sake of efficiency. For example, there is little
reason to limit a financing institution to an entity that "primarily deals in
money. '334 The important issue is whether that vehicle reduces the cost
of providing goods and services to the government. Similarly, there
should be no prohibition against the assignment of receivables on com-
pleted contracts because the probable difficulty in financing receivables
that do not qualify for ACA protection ultimately increases costs to the
government buyer.335
In summary, although it is healthy to debate government's spending
priorities, the need for efficiency in administering spending programs
cannot be denied. Efficient financing increases the size of the government
330. Central Bank v. United States, 345 U.S. 639, 646 (1953) ("[I]t is urged that the [ACA]
should be construed so as to protect the United States. The short answer to this is that the
[ACA] should be construed so as to carry out the purpose of Congress to encourage the private
financing of government contracts.").
331. See supra part III.B.2.
332. See Alanthus Peripherals, Inc., 54 Comp. Gen. 80, 84 (1974).
333. In addition to compliance guidelines, the government could publish payment statistics
on various categories of procurement contracts. This would educate investors on govern-
ment's payment record and provide some benchmark to evaluate an individual contractor's
performance. This would also serve as a tool in rating and pricing transactions.
334. See 54 Comp. Gen. at 84.
335. This may explain why government is required to pay high interest rates under the
Prompt Payment Act. See supra part VI.B.
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purse. It makes more money available for all programs. Accordingly,
the ACA should be applied with an eye towards saving money.336
VII. CONCLUSION
The securitization of federal accounts receivable has the potential to
rival the emerging market in securitized trade receivables.337 While issu-
ers must take care in structuring these offerings, 338 federal accounts re-
ceivable reflect several characteristics that favor securitization: They are
the product of a long-established industry; the social, economic, and legal
environments that drive that industry are not prone to radical change;
government, the ultimate obligor, is stable; and these receivables have a
proven track record evidenced by over fifty years of use in related financ-
ings. Fundamentally, government accounts receivable are valuable assets
and properly structured FAst-BackS offerings should be just as attractive
as commercial and consumer receivable-backed deals. While the present
lack of a market for FAst-BackS raises some concerns, this is most prob-
ably due to a general misunderstanding of the business and regulation of
government contracting as opposed to any technical obstacles in struc-
turing transactions.
Securitization is a financing tool that is reshaping the way that man-
ufacturing and service organizations fund their operations. Government
contractors, holding uniquely valuable assets, are free to exploit this op-
portunity. The failure to take advantage of securitization is waste at the
public's expense. It is time for the government contracting industry to
become "as ingeniously systematized as ... a great private mercantile
institution. ' 339
Kirk Cypel*
336. Central Bank, 345 U.S. at 646-47 (explaining that the ACA should be construed to
"encourage the private financing of government contracts" in manner that does not create risk
for assignee, make financing more difficult for assignor or increase cost).
337. See Liebowitz, supra note 15.
338. Schooner & Schooner, supra note 5, at 565.
339. TWAIN, supra note 1, at 45.
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Comment is dedicated to the memory of William Cypel, may his name become a blessing.
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